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Article 3

Tort Law and Journalism Ethics
By Richard T. Karcher*

I. INTRODUCTION

Journalists learn in journalism school that, in disseminating the news,
they have an ethical obligation to "seek the truth," avoid sensationalism
and trivia, and protect individual privacy interests. Yet, when it comes
to matters involving high-profile people, these ethical obligations
routinely get swept under the rug. Compromising ethics in journalism
appears to be an acceptable industry norm that has continued to evolve
because (1) the media determines what information is "newsworthy,"
(2) there is no external mechanism or independent body to enforce
journalism ethics codes, and (3) tort privacy and defamation law
standards applicable to the press that were developed nearly half a
century ago conflict with journalism ethics codes and do not create
incentives for journalists to comply with such codes.
These
observations raise important questions for society, journalists, and
judges. What is the role of journalism ethics in today's journalism
marketplace that is driven by bottom-line economics and vigorous
competition among multiple media sources delivering news in a variety
of formats seeking to grab the public's attention? It is debatable
whether journalism ethics principles can co-exist in a time-pressured
environment in which media sources have the additional pressure to
"out sell" their competitors. If it is acknowledged that journalism ethics
principles have inherent social value, a question this Article attempts to
answer is whether the press and free market principles are capable of
regulating ethics in today's journalism marketplace.
Part II of this Article compares and contrasts the ethical obligations
of news reporters under journalism ethics codes with their reporting
obligations under state defamation and privacy tort laws. 1 Part III
discusses the infiltration of tabloid journalism into traditional media
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law and Sports, at Florida Coastal
School of Law. I want to especially thank my wife, Jennifer, for being extremely supportive in
my efforts to complete this Article.
1. See infra Part l (discussing the tension between journalism ethics codes and tort law).
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sources, including the proliferation of sensationalism, triviality, and
disregard for privacy, with a particular emphasis on news coverage of
the sports and entertainment industries. 2 This section also addresses the
different standards for public figures created by the media, whether such
standards promote justifiable social policy objectives, and how the
media's creation of such standards impacts society's views and
treatment of public figures. 3 Part IV highlights evidence from a 2008
survey of journalists conducted by The Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press that convincingly demonstrates why the journalism
marketplace in the twenty-first century encourages a "tabloid" news
media and fails to provide the press with appropriate incentives to
adhere to journalism ethics codes. 4 The time is ripe to revisit the stricter
tort law standards that shield the press, developed over forty years ago
in a remarkably different free market and technological journalism
environment. Finally, Part V provides suggestions for incorporating
journalism ethics codes into tort law standards in a manner that would
create incentives for the press to internally regulate journalism ethics
and give some teeth to journalism ethics codes without compromising
5
the First Amendment.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN JOURNALISM ETHICS CODES AND TORT LAW
Although journalism ethics codes are universally adopted by media
outlets, their impact on the media is questionable. As this section will
demonstrate, the duties of the press under self-regulatory journalism
6
ethics codes tend to clash with the duties of the press imposed by law.
Journalists are caught in a quagmire between journalism ethics
standards that are generally concerned about the effects on the citizenry
of an unrestrained free press and legal standards that are more
concerned about the consequences of a restrained free press on the
citizenry. In contrast to public regulatory standards created and
enforced under state defamation and privacy tort laws that are binding
on the press-though the application of the First Amendment has pulled
much of the teeth out of those standards-journalism ethics codes lack
2.

See infra Part III (examining the proliferation of tabloid journalism in traditional news

media sources).
3.

See infra Part III (looking at the implications of standards created by the media for public

figures).
4. See infra Part IV (showing how current market forces are insufficient to regulate journalism

ethics).
5. See infra Part V (exploring how journalism ethics codes can be incorporated into tort law
standards without compromising the First Amendment).
6. See infra Part H (examining the discrepancy between press duties under self-regulatory
journalism ethics codes and press duties under law).
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any external enforcement mechanism.7 Thus, it is highly suspect
whether these self-regulatory industry standards provide sports
journalists with a functioning compass to guide their investigation and
reporting and to serve as an adequate deterrent to unethical journalism
8
practices.
Before defining ethical standards for journalists, a preliminary
question is the definition of journalism ethics. Journalism ethics can be
described as a system of moral principles and values, or a set of
principles governing righteous conduct, recognized and understood
within the culture of journalism. Its necessity is probably best
summarized by Professor Blake Morant:
Democracy that fosters mutual respect for the autonomous rights of
others tacitly encourages citizens, including members of the press, to
exercise their rights responsibly. .

.

. Respect for others and the

preservation of societal norms or institutions require media to behave
ethically as it exercises9 its functions as both govemmental monitor
and responsible citizen.

Journalism ethics are defined within written journalism ethics codes
that establish industry-wide norms, and virtually every media source has
an established code of conduct. 10 Ethics codes are self-policing
mechanisms designed to ensure more responsible journalism, and they
serve to guide press behavior
and symbolize the industry's good faith in
1
its reporting conduct.
The Committee of Concerned Journalists (CCJ), affiliated with the
University of Missouri School of Journalism, is a consortium of
reporters, editors, producers, publishers, owners, and academics
7. See Blake D. Morant, The Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE

DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 595, 613 (2005) ("Without some external mechanism that
compels compliance, journalistic codes of ethics and, to a certain extent, agreements that limit
dissemination of certain sensitive information appear hollow and largely symbolic."). See also
Jeff Storey, Does Ethics Make Good Law? A Case Study, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467,

471 (2001) (discussing the vague standards of ethics enforcement codes, as well as the lack of
enforcement mechanisms).
8. See Morant, supra note 7, at 612-15. Professor Morant notes that the lack of an external
enforcement mechanism distinguishes journalism ethics codes from similar standards adopted by
other professions, such as law and medicine, whereby the ethical codes applicable to such
professions are more precisely drafted and enforced by an independent regulatory authority. Id.
at 613 (citing Bruce W. Sanford, Ethics, Codes and the Law, QUILL, Nov.-Dec., 1994, at 43, 43
(stating that codes governing other professions are more specific and derive their power from the
government's power to license)). See also Storey, supra note 7, at 471 nn.30-31 (noting that
many journalists, convinced that journalists should be left to solve their own problems, balked at
the notion of creating "common law" of journalistic practices).
9. Morant, supra note 7, at 603-04.
10. Id.at6ll.
11.

Id. at 597.
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organized for the purpose of creating a national conversation to more
clearly define a set of core principles that set journalists apart from
other professions.' 2 In 1997, CCJ, which at the time was administered
by the Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ), released a Statement
of Shared Purpose identifying nine core journalism principles. 13
The Statement of Shared Purpose defines the central purpose of
journalism as providing citizens with accurate and reliable information
they need to function in a free society. 14 It identifies nine "Core
Principles":
(1) Journalism's first obligation is to the truth;
(2) Its first loyalty is to citizens;
(3) Its essence is a discipline of verification;
(4) Its practitioners must maintain an independence from those they cover;
(5) It must serve as an independent monitor of power;
(6) It must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise;
(7) It must strive to make the significant interesting and relevant;
(8) It must keep the news comprehensive and proportional; and
15
(9) Its practitioners must be allowed to exercise their personal conscience.
For purposes of this Article, these nine Core Principles will be
summarized into three primary ethical obligations of the press: (1) an

12. See
Journalism.org,
The
Committee
of
Concerned
Journalists,
http://www.journalism.org/resources/about-ccj (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (calling for a national
conversation amongst media professionals about the goals and future of journalism). There are
numerous journalism ethics codes that have been adopted by various news organizations and
trade associations, setting forth similar guidelines, principles, and obligations for the journalism
industry. See, e.g., Associated Press Managing Editors, Statement of Ethical Principles,
http://www.apme.com/ethics/ (last visited June 26, 2008) (setting forth the Associated Press's
Ethical
Principles);
Society
of
Professional
Journalists,
Code
of
Ethics,
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited June 26, 2008) [hereinafter SPJ Code of Ethics]
(setting forth a Code of Ethics for the Society of Professional Journalists); The New York Times
Company Policy on Ethics in Journalism, http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-timescoe.htmi (last visited June 26, 2008) (setting forth the company policy on ethics in journalism).
13. Project for Excellence in Journalism, Principles of Journalism, http://www.journalism.org/
resources/principles (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Statement of Shared Purpose]. The
Statement of Shared Purpose is the product of four years of research, including twenty public
forums, a reading of journalism history, and a national survey of journalists. Id. The Core
Principles subsequently became the basis for the book The Elements of Journalism by PEJ
Director Tom Rosenstiel and CCJ Chairman and PEJ Senior Counselor Bill Kovach. BILL
KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM (2d ed. 2007). The most recent
edition of the book, published in April 2007, includes a tenth journalism principle: the rights and
responsibilities of citizens, flowing from new power conveyed by technology to the citizen as a
consumer and editor of his or her own news and information. Id. at 9.
14. Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13.
15. Id.
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obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, 16 (2) an obligation to
maintain independence and loyalty to the citizenry, 17 and (3) an
obligation to avoid sensationalism and trivia and to protect individual
18
privacy interests in the dissemination of "newsworthy" information.
These ethical obligations exist in virtually all ethics codes in some form
or another. 19 Moreover, these rules of behavior codified by the media
create an express,20 almost moral, obligation to the public to act ethically
and responsibly.
A. Reporting Truthfully and Accurately
The ethical obligation in the first category, to speak truthfully and
accurately, essentially reiterates the CCJ's definition of journalism's
central purpose of providing accurate and reliable information. Simply
put, "accuracy is the foundation upon which everything else is builtcontext, interpretation, comment, criticism, analysis and debate." 2 1 The
"journalistic truth" is a process that begins with the professional
discipline of assembling and verifying facts, and then conveying a fair
and reliable account of their meaning, currently valid but subject to
further investigation. 2 2 The method of testing and verifying the
information used by journalists must be transparent and objective so
that personal and cultural biases do not undermine the accuracy of their
work and audiences can make their own assessments of the
information. 23 This discipline of verification-seeking out multiple
witnesses, disclosing as much as possible about sources, or asking
various sides for comment-"is what separates journalism from other
modes of communication, such as propaganda, fiction or
entertainment. '24 The ethical obligation to report truthfully and
accurately, and to diligently verify the information, arises out of
concern for the citizenry and creates an implied duty to properly inform
16. See id. (combining Core Principles 1,3, and 6 to form this obligation).
17. See id. (combining Core Principles 2, 4, 5, 7, and 9 to form this obligation).
18. See id. (combining Core Principles 7-8 to form this obligation).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing journalism ethics codes).
20. Morant, supra note 7, at 612.
21. Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle I.
22. See id. at Core Principle I (discussing journalism's first obligation to pursue "journalistic
truth").
23. See id. at Core Principles 1, 3 (emphasizing that journalists rely on a professional
discipline for verifying information).
24. See id. at Core Principle 3 (discussing the journalistic discipline of verification). See also
SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12 (providing that journalists should "[tiest the accuracy of
information from all sources and exercise care to avoid inadvertent error .... Diligently seek out
subjects of news stories to give them the opportunity to respond to allegations of wrongdoing....
[and] [a]lways question sources' motives before promising anonymity.").
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the citizenry: "As citizens encounter an ever greater flow of data, they
have more need-not less-for identifiable sources dedicated to

25
verifying that information and putting it in context.
However, the duty owed by the press to the citizenry to inform it

truthfully and accurately, as reflected in journalism ethics codes, is not
recognized in the law. The public does not have any enforceable legal
right against the press when it receives untruthful and inaccurate
information. The First Amendment does not provide that citizens have
a right to be accurately informed; rather, it serves to protect the
disseminators of inaccurate information in certain contexts.
Furthermore, when an individual is harmed as a result of the press's

dissemination of inaccurate information to the public, tort defamation
law may provide a remedy if the false information about that individual
is defamatory. 26 It is often said that truth is a complete defense to
defamation liability. 2 7 Under common law defamation principles,
private-figure plaintiffs have recourse against the press if the press is
unable to meet its burden of proving that the defamatory information
disseminated was true.2 8 However, the Supreme Court has held, in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, that where a newspaper
publishes speech of public concern, allowing a private-figure plaintiff to

25. See Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle I (arguing that
democracy depends on citizens having reliable, accurate facts put in a meaningful context). See
also SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12 (providing that journalists should "[ildentify sources
whenever feasible. The public is entitled to as much information as possible on sources'
reliability.").
26. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 965 (3d ed.
2005) ("Not all false statements about the plaintiff give rise to a defamation claim: a statement
must injure the plaintiffs reputation to be actionable."). A defamatory statement is defined as
one that tends "to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
27. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 971.
28. See id. ("At common law, the defendant had the burden of proving that the statement was
true .... In some cases, imposing the burden of proving falsity upon the plaintiff may make it
virtually impossible to establish defamation."). Moreover, at common law, if a private-figure
plaintiff in a libel case established that the statement disseminated was defamatory, damages were
presumed-thus eliminating the necessity for the plaintiff to prove actual harm. Id. at 985. Some
states have limited this rule to certain types of statements or to only when the statement is
defamatory on its face. Id. at note a (citing Lega Siciliana Social Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, 825
A.2d 827 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a written statement linking a private club to the
Mafia was libelous per se and it was therefore unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove actual
damages)). Section 558 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists the elements of defamation as
"(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a
third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused
by the publication." RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS § 558 (1977).
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recover damages without showing that the statements in question were
false is a violation of the First Amendment.2 9 But as one commentator
noted, it remains to be seen whether the Hepps rule "will be extended to
cases involving non-media defendants or matters not of 'public
concern."'30
The duty owed by the press to private figures under defamation law
tends to be more in line with the duty of the press under journalism
ethics principles because both duties generally seek to ensure the
truthful and accurate dissemination of information to the citizenry.
However, there frequently exists an inherent conflict between tort law
and journalism ethics codes when the press reports on matters involving
public figures and public officials. The conflict arises from the actualmalice burden created by the seminal 1964 decision in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,3 1 where the United States Supreme Court articulated the
oft-cited standard:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
32
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The Supreme Court thereafter extended the New York Times actualmalice standard to public figures-those who "by reason of their fame,
shape events in areas of concern to society at large"-including
entertainers and sports participants, such as athletes, coaches, league
33
officials, athletic directors, and front office personnel.
Thus, while the press has an ethical duty to be truthful and accurate,
defamation law's actual malice standard adds a scienter component and
imposes a duty only when the press knowingly disseminates untruthful
and inaccurate information about public officials and public figures 34 or
29. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
30. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 971.
31. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32. Id. at 279-80.
33. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (holding that an athletic director
accused of conspiring to "fix" a college football game by the Saturday Evening Post was a public
figure). "Consonant with this definition, a college athletic director, a basketball coach, a
professional boxer and a professional baseball player, among others, have all been held to be
'public figures."' Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1971).
34. In St. Amant v. Thompson, the United States Supreme Court clarified that only defendants
who publish with subjective "awareness of probable falsity" are "reckless."
St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). See also Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) ("The standard is a subjective one-there must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a 'high degree of awareness of... probable
falsity."' (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964))).
As noted by one

788
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"where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant
or the accuracy of his reports." 35 Relying on a single, and perhaps
unreliable, source without verifying the accuracy of the statement has
been held not to be "reckless." 36 Moreover, under the actual malice
standard, courts have held that there is no duty or obligation on the part
of the press to (1) talk to the subject of the defamatory publication to
obtain that person's version of the events described, 3 7 (2) endeavor to
present an objective picture, 3 8 or (3) not engage in speculative or even
sloppy reporting. 3 9 The duty of the press under these holdings is
inconsistent with the ethical obligation of the press to diligently test and
verify information, to disclose as much as possible about sources, to
40
seek out multiple witnesses, and to ask various sides for comment.
A plaintiff who is unable to establish a defamation claim against the
press may prevail on a false light claim, which tends to be much broader
than defamation. First, while truth is a defense to a publisher in a
defamation action, the literal truth of published facts is not a defense in
a false light action. 4 1 In other words, a publisher may be subject to
liability if the facts are presented from an angle, or an erroneous or
misleading impression is created, that renders the publication
susceptible to inferences casting the plaintiff in a false light. 42 Second,

commentator, "[b]ecause the actual-malice standard makes constitutional protection depend upon
the defendant's state of mind, the focus of the litigation often shifts away from the issue of
whether the defamatory statement was true or false." JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 992.
35. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).
36. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732-33 (finding that the failure to investigate the source of
information did not in itself establish bad faith). But see Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 169-70
(holding that a publisher's reliance on a single unreliable source and refusal to interview another
factual witness constituted recklessness sufficient to meet the actual malice standard).
37. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (finding that a libel action by a
private individual against a radio station for a defamatory newscast may be sustained only by
clear and convincing evidence that the falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not), abrogatedby Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that the
protection of the First Amendment is not limited to statements which reflect an objective picture
of the reported events).
39. See Oliver v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that to
establish recklessness, it is not sufficient to show that the reporting was speculative or even
sloppy, but that there was an extreme departure from the standards of responsible publishing and
investigation).
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing ethical obligations imposed by
various journalism organizations).
41. See West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 645-46 n.5 (Tenn. 2001)
(noting the differences between defamation and false light).
42. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the plaintiffs posing for Playboy Magazine was consistent with respectability for a model and
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in a false light claim, the published facts need not rise to the level of

being defamatory in3 nature, but must only be "highly offensive to a
4
reasonable person."

The jurisprudence in the false light area has made it difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed on a false light claim. First, because the claim
tends to resemble defamation, many courts have rejected false light, and
a little more than half of the states treat it as a viable claim. 44 Second,
in states that recognize the claim of false light, when the publication

pertains to a false report involving a matter of public interest, the
plaintiff has the difficult burden of proving actual malice-that the
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.4 5 Moreover, when the publication
actress but that posing nude in Hustler Magazine was not, so that to portray the plaintiff as
voluntarily posing nude for Hustler could be thought to place her in a false light even though she
had voluntarily posed nude for Playboy only). In Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., the plaintiff,
a ten-year old girl, was injured in a traffic accident that was not her fault, and the defendant
published a picture of the accident scene in a story about pedestrian carelessness. Leverton v.
Curtis Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974, 974-75 (3d Cir. 1951). The Leverton court held the false light
claim to be actionable because the publisher created a misleading impression that the plaintiff was
careless. Id. at 977.
43. Section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the false light tort:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a)
the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 652E (1977). See Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 n.9
(1967) ("In the 'right of privacy' cases the primary damage is the mental distress from having
been exposed to public view, although injury to reputation may be an element bearing upon such
damage... the published matter need not be defamatory, on its face or otherwise, and might even
be laudatory and still warrant recovery.").
44. See Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 903 (Colo. 2002) (refusing to recognize
false light, but noting that thirty state courts treat it as a viable claim); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878
S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to recognize false light because defamation encompasses
most false light claims and false light "lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany
actions for defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists between free
speech constitutional guarantees and tort law").
45. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the United States Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard
to false reports about matters of public interest. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 390-91. "[T]he
constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to
redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant
published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at
387-88. See also West, 53 S.W.3d at 647 ("We hold that actual malice is the appropriate standard
for false light claims when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, or when the claim is
asserted by a private individual about a matter of public concern."). The Time case involved a
magazine article about a play that was based on a crime in which the plaintiffs were held hostage
in their home for nineteen hours. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 377-79. The article falsely reported that
the plaintiffs had been subjected to violent and brutal treatment while being held hostage. Id. at
378. Although the statements were most likely not defamatory, the statements were factually
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pertains to a private individual involving a matter of private concern,
Indeed, there is
some states impose a negligence standard.46
inconsistency among the states that recognize false light regarding the
appropriate standard because some states have adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts' view that the actual malice standard applies to all
false light claims, even when the claim is 47brought by a private
individual involving a matter of private concern.
B. MaintainingIndependence and Loyalty to the Citizenry
While journalism's first obligation is to the truth, its first loyalty is to
the citizenry. 4 8 The ethical obligation to maintain independence and
loyalty to the citizenry is essential to a news organization's credibility"the implied covenant that tells the audience the coverage is not slanted
for friends or advertisers." 4 9
News organizations have many
constituents, including shareholders and advertisers, and "journalists
must maintain allegiance to citizens and the larger public interest above
50
any other if they are to provide the news without fear or favor."
Citizens rely on an independent press to serve as watchdog over those
whose power and position most affects them, and journalists "have an

obligation to protect this watchdog freedom by not demeaning it in

inaccurate. Id. at 393-94. The false light claim in Time should be distinguished from a false light
claim in which the statements about the plaintiff are literally true, but create a misleading
impression that is degrading to the plaintiff or makes the plaintiff seem pathetic or ridiculous or
that he lacks good taste or moral judgment. Id. at 394.
46. See West, 53 S.W.3d at 648 (noting that "when false light invasion of privacy claims are
asserted by a private plaintiff regarding a matter of private concern, the plaintiff need only prove
that the defendant publisher was negligent in placing the plaintiff in a false light").
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) (stating that an individual who
gives publicity concerning another in a false light is subject to liability if the false light is highly
offensive to the reasonable person and the actor had knowledge of the falsity of the publicized
matter). See also West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tenn. 2001) ("In
light of the uncertain position of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the
constitutional standard for false light claims brought by private individuals about matters of
private interest, many courts and Section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopt actual
malice as the standard for all false light claims.").
48. See Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principles 1 and 2 (providing
journalists' obligations to truth and loyalty to the citizenry).
49. See id. at Core Principle 2 (setting forth loyalty to citizens as the basis for a news
organization's credibility). "[L]oyalty is one of the key considerations in ethical decisionmaking." Amit Schejter, Jacob's Voice, Esau's Hands: Transparency As a First Amendment
Right in an Age of Deceit and Impersonation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1489, 1509 (2007).
50. See Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle 2 (noting that this
implied covenant to citizens tells the audience that coverage is not slanted for friends or
advertisers). See also SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12 ("Journalists should be free of
obligations to any interest other than the public's right to know.").
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frivolous use or exploiting it for commercial gain." 5 1 Maintaining
independence requires diligence in avoiding
conflicts of interest and
52
unavoidable.
are
that
conflicts
disclosing
The Associated Press has even adopted ethics guidelines specifically
for sports editors that address conflicts of interest. 53 For example,
sports editors and reporters are discouraged from receiving benefits,
gifts, or discounts (e.g., game tickets, travel expenses, accommodations,
food, and drink) from the teams they are covering. 5 4 They are also
discouraged from taking part in outside activities or employment that
might create an actual or perceived conflict of interest, such as serving
as an official scorer at baseball games or writing for team or league
media guides or publications. 5 5 The Associated Press also suggests that
newspapers "should carefully consider the implications of voting for all
awards and all-star teams and decide if such voting creates a conflict of
56
interest."
But here again, although a self-regulatory ethical duty exists, there is
no comparable enforceable legal duty of the press to maintain
independence and loyalty to the citizenry. Although tort common law
generally recognizes a duty of loyalty, which encompasses the duty to
avoid conflicts of interest, the duty of loyalty only applies in the context
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. 57 Without imposition of a
legal duty, the press lacks an incentive to comply with an ethical
obligation that lacks any enforcement mechanism.
Another distinction between the ethical and tort duties of the press
lies in the relevance of motive. For example, the ethical obligation to
maintain independence and loyalty to the citizenry requires the press to
51. Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle 5.
52. See SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12 (providing that journalists should "[a]void conflicts
of interest, real or perceived ....Remain free of associations and activities that may compromise
integrity or damage credibility ....[and] [d]isclose unavoidable conflicts.").
53. See
Associated
Press
Sports
Editors,
APSE
Ethics
Guidelines,
http://apse.dallasnews.com/main/codeofethics.html (last visited July 5, 2008) (setting forth ethics
guidelines for the Associated Press Sports Editors).
54. Id. fi 1, 3, 4 ("The newspaper pays its staffer's way for travel, accommodations, food and
drink ....No deals, discounts or gifts except those of insignificant value or those available to the
public. . . . A newspaper should not accept free tickets, although press credentials needed for
coverage and coordination are acceptable.").
55. Id. 2.
56. Id. 5.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Therefore, the duty of loyalty,
including the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, recognized under tort common law in fiduciary
relationships, is consistent with the ethical obligation of attorneys imposed by the legal ethics
rules to avoid conflicts of interest. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 1.7-1.9
(2002).
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avoid exploitation for commercial gain. However, publishing a story
for the purpose, or with the motive, of financial gain does not meet the
actual malice standard for establishing a defamation cause of action; "a
profit motive does not strip communications of constitutional
protections." 58 In addition, the press has an ethical obligation to
"minimize harm," for example by showing "compassion for those who
may be affected adversely by news coverage" and recognizing "that
gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort [and
that] [p]ursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance." 59 However, a
finding of actual malice based upon proof of bad motive, ill will, hatred,
60
vindictiveness, enmity, or desire to injure is constitutionally defective.
C. Avoiding Sensationalismand Trivia, and ProtectingPrivacy, in the
Disseminationof "Newsworthy" Information
The third primary ethical obligation, to avoid sensationalism and
trivia and to protect individual privacy interests in the dissemination of
"newsworthy" information, concerns what information is being
conveyed and in what form. It could be the most vital ethical obligation
because the press has unfettered discretion to determine both. The press
not only tells society what to think about, but it also has a huge
influence on how we think about it. Therefore, the press carries a huge
ethical responsibility.
According to the CCJ, journalists have a responsibility to "balance
what readers know they want with what they cannot anticipate but
need" and to "continually ask what information has most value to
citizens and in what form." 61 This ethical obligation is consistent with
journalism's central purpose, as defined by the CCJ, of providing
information that citizens "need to function in a free society." 62 It
requires that journalists keep news in proportion and not omit important
facts and events. 63 As appropriately noted by the CCJ, "[j]ournalism is
58. Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. v. Kaufman, 113 F.3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1997). See also
Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (finding that "a
newspaper's motive in publishing a story-whether to promote an opponent's candidacy or to
increase its circulation-cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice").
59. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12.
60. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 992. See Garrison v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 7375 (1964) ("Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it
will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances
honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.").
61. Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle 7.
62. See id. (emphasis added) (stating that journalism must balance what readers know they
want with what they cannot anticipate, and yet need).
63. See id. at Core Principle 8 (stating that journalism should proportionately disseminate
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a form of cartography: it creates a map for citizens to navigate society.
Inflating events for sensation, neglecting others, stereotyping or being
disproportionately negative all make a less reliable map." 64 Journalism
65
is most effective when it both engages and enlightens its audience.
However, "a journalism overwhelmed by trivia and false significance
ultimately engenders a trivial society."66
The ethics code adopted by the Society of Professional Journalists
(SPJ) contains similar obligations on the part of the press to use good
judgment in deciding what constitutes newsworthy information and to
avoid sensationalism, stereotyping, and disseminating trivial
information. It provides that journalists should:
" Make certain that headlines, news teases and promotional material,
photos, video, audio, graphics, sound bites and quotations do not
misrepresent. They should not oversimplify or highlight incidents
out of context.
* Avoid undercover or other surreptitious methods of gathering
information except when traditional open methods will not yield
information vital to the public.
* Examine their own cultural values and avoid imposing those values
on others.
" Avoid stereotyping by race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity,
geography, sexual orientation, disability, physical appearance or
social status.
" Distinguish between advocacy and news reporting. Analysis and
commentary should be labeled and not misrepresent fact or
67
content.
In determining whether information is newsworthy, the SPJ's ethics
code also requires journalists to consider the privacy interest of the
subject and the potential harm to individuals who may be adversely
affected by news coverage. 6 8 It states that "[o]nly an overriding public
need can justify intrusion into anyone's privacy." 69 It further provides
news of all communities, and not only those communities with appealing demographics).
64. Id.
65. See id. at Core Principle 7 ("While journalism should reach beyond such topics as
government and public safety, a journalism overwhelmed by trivia and false significance

ultimately engenders a trivial society.").
66. Id.
67. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12.
68. Id. See also Associated Press Managing Editors, Statement of Ethical Principles,
http://www.apme.comlethics/ (last visited July 9, 2008) ("The newspaper should uphold the right

of free speech and freedom of the press and should respect the individual's right to privacy.").
69.

SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12.
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that journalists should "[a]void pandering to lurid curiosity" and "[b]e
judicious about naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of
70
charges."
Unfortunately, tort privacy laws do not afford an adequate legal
remedy for an individual whose privacy interest has been affected when
the press oversteps its bounds from an ethics standpoint. The idea that
tort law should reign in all the gossip issued by the press and afford
redress when the press violates an individual's privacy interest was first
advocated by Charles Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery .... To occupy the indolent, column
upon column is filled with idle gossip,
which can only be procured by
71
intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Warren and Brandeis were convinced that there ought to be
limitations placed on the press's ability to publish truthful personal
information regarding the private lives of individuals in society, even
when the individual is a public figure. 7 2 Seventy years later, William
Prosser suggested that the "privacy" tort be classified into four types of
invasion: (1) public disclosure of private facts; (2) intrusion; (3) false
light; and (4) appropriation of name or likeness. 73 Warren and Brandeis
were primarily concerned about the invasion into Prosser's first
classification, the public disclosure of private facts.
In the public disclosure of private facts claim, courts have difficulty
balancing privacy with the freedom of expression under the First
Amendment. This balancing act-weighing an individual's privacy
interest against the newsworthiness of the information-is set forth in
section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
74
public.
The comment to the Restatement illustrates the nature of facts that
would tend to be considered "highly offensive:"
70. Id.
71. Charles D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
72. Id.at 216.
73. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and
some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but
keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to
close friends. Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely
private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful
or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of
a man's life in his home, and some of his past history that he would
rather forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread before
the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary
reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion
of his privacy, unless
75
the matter is one of legitimate public interest.
It is interesting to note how the definition of "newsworthy" in section
652D ("legitimate concern to the public") differs from that used in the
comment ("legitimate public interest"). The use of the word "concern"
tends to connote more of a public need for the information or that the
information contains some level of importance to the public, which is
consistent with the ethical obligation of the press to provide information
that citizens need to function in a free society. 76 On the other hand,
information that is of "interest" to the public can be construed much
broader to include trivial information that is not vital to the public.
Courts have struggled with both how to define newsworthiness and how
to balance an individual's right to privacy with the public's right to
information, which has led to inconsistent definitions and holdings.
For example, in one case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied a rather complicated standard for newsworthiness that involved
balancing three factors: "(1) the social value of the facts published, (2)
the depth of the publication's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs,
and (3) the extent to which the party voluntarily assumed a position of
public notoriety. '7 7 In another case, the Second Circuit held:
[T]he misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "public figures" are
subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the
population[ ] [a]nd when such are the mores of the community, it
would be unwise for a court to bar
their expression in the newspapers,
78
books, and magazines of the day.

75. Id. § 652D cmt. b.
76. See supra note 13 (discussing The Statement of Shared Purpose as defining the core
purpose of journalism as providing citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to
function in a free society).
77. Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 787 F.2d 463, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting a privacy claim by
a once famous child prodigy who cloaked himself in obscurity as an adult and became the
unwilling subject of a brief biographical sketch and cartoon printed in the New Yorker weekly
magazine).
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In defining newsworthiness, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that public interest is "not limited to
dissemination of news about current events or public affairs, but also
protects 'information concerning interesting phases of human activity
and embraces all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate so that that individual may cope with the exigencies of their
period.' 79 All three of the foregoing standards for determining
newsworthiness are not very practical or workable standards for the
courts because they entail a normative or value assessment of the facts
published, which is entirely subjective.
Modem notions of freedom of speech have substantially reduced the
deterrence component that the disclosure of private facts claim once
served for the press. The modernization of free speech has permitted
the press to reveal some very private information that most individuals
in society would choose to keep secret or to at least not have disclosed
to the entire world.8 ° Some state courts have even gone so far as to
refuse to recognize a disclosure of private facts claim due to its conflict
with the First Amendment. 81 Also, courts generally defer to the First
Amendment when a public figure is involved or a matter of public
concern is at issue. In essence, the greater the extent to which the
plaintiff is a public figure or the matter is one of public concern, the
more newsworthy it becomes. As one commentator noted, a disclosure
of private facts claim "has a serious chance of success only if the facts
have nothing to do with the plaintiff's conduct as a public figure or with
a matter of legitimate public interest." 82 For example, in Diaz v.
Oakland Tribune, Inc.,83 a newspaper published that the plaintiff, the
79. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Campbell v. Seabury
Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980)). However, the Vassiliades court also recognized that
"the privilege to publicize matters of legitimate public interest is not absolute. Certain private
facts about a person should never be publicized, even if the facts concern matters which are, or
relate to persons who are, of legitimate public interest." Id. (citing Gilbert v. Med. Econs. Co.,
665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981) and Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.
1975)). The Vassiliades court held that the plaintiff's privacy interest in the unauthorized use of
"before" and "after" photographs of her cosmetic face-lift surgery in a department store
presentation outweighed the public's interest in the subject. Id. at 589.
80. See, e.g., infra notes 94-97, 114-20 and accompanying text (discussing public disclosure
of professional athlete misconduct and personal issues).
81. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (noting that "it would be entirely
unrealistic to suggest that adoption of the private facts tort would do other than 'add to the tension
already existing between the First Amendment and the law of torts"' (citing Renwick v. News &
Observer, 312 S.E.2d 405, 412 (N.C. 1984)). See also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681,
693 (Ind. 1997) (noting that "torts involving disclosure of truthful but private facts encounter[] a
considerable obstacle in the truth-in-defense provisions of the Indiana Constitution").
82. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 1037-38.
83. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983).
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president of the student body at her college, had once been a man and
had a sex change operation before entering college. The court held that
although the plaintiff "waived" her right to privacy about her public life
as president of the student body, it did84not "warrant that her entire
private life be open to public inspection."
III. THE PROLIFERATION OF TABLOID JOURNALISM IN TRADITIONAL
NEWS MEDIA SOURCES

A. Infotainment

The entertainment format of news reporting has been termed
"infotainment."
Infotainment refers to a general type of media
broadcast program containing a mixture of current events news and
entertainment news such as "feature stories," interviews, commentaries,
and reviews. 85 Infotainment also refers to the segments of television
news programming which consist of both "hard news" segments and
interviews, along with celebrity interviews and human drama stories.
Simply, news conflicts with entertainment and infotainment conflicts
with journalism ethics principles. Infotainment may have value if the
news is presented in a format that more people will read and watch, thus
creating a greater public interest and awareness about major events.
However, the mixture of news and entertainment poses ethical problems
for journalism because this format tends to skew the information and
makes it very difficult for the public to separate fact from fiction or
opinion, which can lead to a misinformed society.
There are other ethical problems associated with infotainment.
Infotainment is oftentimes "opinion-oriented" and pits one side against
another. While this adversarial format can be an effective way to flush
out varying sides and points of view, it also tends to legitimize
negativity, anger, and hatred and creates an "us against them" mentality.
Society's attention is diverted from the content of the news and the
primary focus for the audience is to decide who won, or to decide who
or which is better. Infotainment plays on the emotions of the audience
and advocates certain positions. It is also geared towards persuading
the audience to feel or think a certain way about the information or the
manner in which the information is presented. However, when the
entertainment portion is absent, the audience can digest the information
and make its own independent assessment and judgment.
84. Id. at 773.
85. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2006),
availableat http://dictionary.reference.coi/browse/infotainment.
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Another ethical problem flowing from infotainment is that it leads to
the generation of powerful stereotypes.
When "feature stories,"
commentary, opinions, and advocacy are mixed with news, the media
directly and indirectly labels individuals in society according to their
backgrounds and experiences and, based upon these labels, makes
generalizations about how these individuals think or act. The audience
becomes brainwashed into thinking that Republicans, Democrats,
lawyers, doctors, athletes, entertainers, rich people, and poor people
think and act a certain way or should think and act a certain way. In the
process, different standards are created by the media, and thereby
society as well, for various individuals depending upon the label they
are assigned.
News reporting in the area of sports and entertainment epitomizes the
effects of infotainment. Compromising journalism ethics in sports and
entertainment news coverage is a topic that requires discussion and
attention. Sensationalism, reporting trivial information, compromising
the privacy interests of athletes and entertainers, holding participants in
the sports and entertainment industries to a different standard, and
inaccurate reporting are disturbing trends, as well as increasingly
acceptable norms. The root of the ethical problems is that news about
sports and entertainment, including athletes and entertainers, results in a
"double dose" of entertainment. In other words, the media apparently
feels that news about entertaining events must be presented in an
entertaining format for the consumer to buy it.
Indeed, the
entertainment format in which news on sports and entertainment is
presented is filtering into other segments of news reporting as well.
Infotainment's future impact on news reporting in other segments of
news coverage can be assessed and evaluated through the lens of sports
and entertainment news coverage. The next sub-section explores the
ethical implications arising from infotainment in the coverage of the
86
sports and entertainment industries.

86.

See infra Part HLI.B (exploring the concepts of sensationalism, triviality, and privacy).
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B. Sensationalism,Triviality, and Privacy

One needs to look no further than the latest sport news headlines to
realize that journalists are engaged in something other than simply
reporting news. The front cover of Golfweek Magazine's January 19,
2008 issue featured the image of a noose against a purple sky
background accompanied with the headline, Caught in a Noose:
Tilghman Slips Up, and Golf Channel Can't Wriggle Free. Some might
attempt to legitimize this headline by characterizing it as an effective
visual representation describing a public controversy involving Kelly
Tilghman's offensive statement made two weeks earlier on the Golf

Channel that the only hope for young, up and coming professional
golfers to compete with the great Tiger Woods would be to "lynch him
in a back alley." However, the harsh reality is that the image and
headline were used by Golfweek to sell more magazines. To be certain,

profiting from disseminating and reporting news, in and of itself, is not
a contentious issue from an ethical standpoint. But it becomes
contentious when a media outlet sensationalizes its news reporting or
reports trivial information such that the dissemination of news becomes
87
secondary to the primary motive of outselling competitors.
Golfweek's headline is just one example among many of sensationalism
88
and highlighting incidents out of context in sports journalism.
The ethical obligation to be diligent in protecting an individual's

87. PGA Tour Commissioner Tim Finchem said in a statement:
Clearly, what Kelly said was inappropriate and unfortunate, and she obviously regrets
her choice of words ....
But we consider Golfweek's imagery of a swinging noose on
its cover to be outrageous and irresponsible. It smacks of tabloid journalism. It was a
naked attempt to inflame and keep alive an incident that was heading to an appropriate
conclusion.
Golfweek Fires Editor Responsible for 'Noose' Imagery, ESPN.coM, Jan. 20, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3202573. According to Tiger Woods, Tilghman's
controversial statement "was more media-driven than anything else." Woods Says He Considers
Tilghman Matter Closed, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.usatoday.comlsports/golf/
pga/2008-01-21 -woods-golf-channelN.htm.
88. To demonstrate an analogous use of infotainment outside of the sports and entertainment
industry, the cover of the July 21, 2008 issue of the New Yorker magazine contained an
illustration depicting Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama dressed as a Muslim
wearing sandals, a robe, and a turban and his wife Michelle dressed in camouflage and combat
boots, with an assault rifle strapped over her shoulder-both standing in the Oval Office doing a
fist tap in front of a fireplace in which an American flag is burning and a portrait of Osama bin
Laden is hanging over the mantel. Alex Mooney, New Yorker Editor Defends Controversial
Obama Cover, CNN.COM, July 14, 2008, http://edition.cnn.comI2008/POLITICS/07/14/
obama.cover/. An Obama campaign spokesman commented, "The New Yorker may think, as one
of their staff explained to us, that their cover is a satirical lampoon of the caricature Senator
Obama's right-wing critics have tried to create .... But most readers will see it as tasteless and
offensive. And we agree." Id.
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privacy interest, to "avoid pandering to lurid curiosity," 89 and to be
judicious about naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of
charges, is frequently compromised by journalists who report on the
lives of athletes and entertainers. Compromising these journalism
ethics principles originated in tabloid and gossip publications.
Journalists, as well as society in general, have legitimized unethical
reporting within those media sources to the point at which it became an
acceptable norm. However, the twenty-first century represents a turning
point for the proliferation of tabloid journalism in traditional
mainstream news media sources. 90 The tabloid news sources and the
mainstream news media are now covering the same stories.9 1 Indeed, in
their news reports, the mainstream news media has even begun to
specifically reference tabloid magazines, such as People Magazine, and
92
merely report the tabloid information published in those magazines.
Today's sports journalists are relentless in their efforts to uncover
incidents of misconduct involving professional and amateur athletes,
whether it involves (1) alleged felony or misdemeanor criminal
behavior before the formal filing of charges, (2) allegations of noncriminal behavior that may impact competition on the field or the
integrity of the game, such as alleged use of performance enhancing
drugs and other forms of "cheating," or (3) even a failure to exercise
"good moral character and judgment" that does not constitute a crime
and has no connection whatsoever with performance on the field. 93 The
89. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12.
90. See Morant, supra note 7, at 629 ("Sex scandals and bizarre lifestyle stories, which in the
past were handled by the once profitable, but not necessarily respectable supermarket tabloids, are
increasingly covered by more mainstream media.").
91.

See David A. Logan, "Stunt Journalism," ProfessionalNorms, and Public Mistrust of the

Media, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 166 (1998) ("The tabloid shows and the mainstream
media often cover the same stories, and the mainstream outlets now often scramble to keep up
with the tabloids."). See also Monica! Bill Clinton Had an Affair, and the Tabloid Tail Began
Wagging the Mainstream Dog, 40 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 124-25 (2001) (opining that the

coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal by the mainstream media demonstrated the extent to
which tabloid-style journalism has infiltrated the mainstream media).
92. See, e.g., Vito Stellino, Pay Disparity Presents Prickly Problem, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July
27, 2008, at C-8 ("Dallas Cowboys quarterback Tony Romo and his girlfriend, singer Jessica
Simpson, were recently spotted having dinner with his folks at an Olive Garden in Janesville,
Wisconsin. According to People Magazine, the restaurant staff thought it was a joke when the
reservation was made."). See also Lorena Bias, Simpson: Just a Country Girl Who's in Love,

USA TODAY, July 31, 2008, at 3D (containing an article in the sports section reporting on a story
published in Elle magazine about actress and singer Jessica Simpson's relationship with Dallas
Cowboys quarterback Tony Romo, taking direct quotes from Simpson that were published in the
magazine); Cindy Clark, Portrait of a Family-Jolie-PittPhotos Are a Study in Nonchalance,

USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2008, at 13D (reporting that pictures of Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt's
newborn twins would be unveiled for the first time by People Magazine).
93.

See, e.g., Jorge L. Ortiz, Martinez, Marichal Ripped for Attending Legal Cockfight,
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sports media diligently keeps society informed on a daily basis,
exposing events of an entirely personal, and oftentimes very private
nature occurring off the field within the lives of sports participants,
94
including drug addictions, financial difficulties, and family problems.
Moreover, as this Part will discuss, sports journalists frequently engage
in surreptitious methods of pursuing information involving sports
participants and entertainers, particularly when the matter involves
possible misconduct or questionable moral character and judgment. In
become obsessed with every indiscretion
recent years, the media has
95
involving a famous person.
In June 2007, the Associated Press released a report about an
offensive line coach with the Pittsburgh Steelers who accidentally
distributed by email an explicit sex video to numerous league personnel,
including the commissioner of the NFL. 96 ChicagoSports.com, an
affiliate of the Chicago Tribune, ran the story with the headline, Sorry
for the Porn, Mr. Commissioner.97 Not only does this headline involve
sensationalism and pandering to lurid curiosity, but the news value of
the information is highly suspect when weighed against the privacy
interest in publicly exposing a sixty-one year-old grandfather who
inadvertently hit the wrong computer key. In addressing the ethical
question, what particular value does this information have for society,
and is this information that the public needs? The offensive line coach
for the Pittsburgh Steelers is certainly not a well-known person
nationally, and he is not even a household name among Steelers fans
living in Pittsburgh. Yet, the Associated Press and the Chicago Tribune
deemed the event newsworthy. This report is just one example among
many involving the publication of an event that was once the exclusive

USATODAY.COM, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2008-02-06-martinezcockfightN.htm#uslPageReturn (describing attendance at a legal cockfighting event in the
Dominican Republic two years earlier by New York Mets pitcher Pedro Martinez and Hall of
Famer Juan Marichal).
94. See, e.g., Reid's Son to Leave Prison, Enter Drug Program, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 2,
2008,http://www.usatoday.comsports/football/nfl/eagles/2008-02-01 -reid-son-treatment-program
_N.htm (reporting that the son of Philadelphia Eagles coach Andy Reid was leaving prison early
and entering drug rehabilitation).
95. In an interview with the Washington Post, former star quarterback Joe Theismann said,
Les Carpenter, Poor Sports: Risking Livelihood and
"There is no anonymity anymore."
Reputation, Some Stars Don't Play by the Rules, WASH. POST, July 29, 2007, at A-01. According
to Theismann, we have become a culture obsessed with celebrity, and in his playing days in the
1980s, there were fifteen teammates who could have been arrested and subject to suspensions by
current standards but the spotlight was different then; the culture was less celebrity-driven, and
every indiscretion by a famous person did not spin in a twenty-four-hour news cycle. Id.
96. Article removed from website (on file with author).
97. Article removed from website (on file with author).
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domain of the tabloid media sources and has now worked its way into
the primary news sources.
Even if the email had instead been sent by a widely-recognized
national figure, such as the starting quarterback for the Steelers, the
justification for publication by the traditional news sources would not
be compelling. Whether this matter involves an unknown assistant
football coach or the star quarterback, in either case it has nothing to do
with the Steelers' performance and it has very limited value for society
otherwise-any value that exists is purely entertainment or lurid
curiosity. Much of today's news coverage frequently involves the
publication of purely trivial information and events regarding public
figures and public officials, including everything from child custody
battles to failure to pay their debts. The publication of such trivial
information does not serve the primary purpose of informing society
about professional athletes' individual roles or performances, but
instead serves to criticize athletes for the decisions they make and
actions they take in their own personal lives. With the headline, Being
Manny, a primary news source in Jacksonville, Florida reported that
Boston Red Sox slugger Manny Ramirez recently "came into $10,000,
courtesy of the state of Massachusetts . . . which had languished as
unclaimed property," and the newspaper added, "Hey, when you're
making $20 million it's easy to forget $10,000 here or $10,000 there."9 8
News reports that critique and even heavily criticize professional
athletes or entertainers regarding their public performances in sporting
events, movies, and television might be rationalized on the same basis
as that of the New York Times privilege-that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . ."99 But the rationale
for the New York Times privilege becomes less convincing when the
media's criticism goes beyond a critique or opinion regarding athletes'
public performances and evolves into nothing more than a pun
motivated by making a mockery of an individual purely for the sake of
entertainment, and not debate. For example, in an opinion column
critiquing Bon Jovi's newly-released compact disc, the author singled
out the band's guitarist, Richie Sambora, and asked "[wlho else can pull
a 25-year pop-metal flashback off with such a straight and Botoxed
face?"' 0 0 The rationale for the New York Times privilege is even more
tenuous when the media's criticism pertains to purely private matters
98. David Johnson, T-U-2, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 13, 2008, at C-2.
99. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
100. Jeff Vrabel, Bon Jovi, You're to Blaine, You Give Cheese a Good Name; Have a Nice
Day CD Is Everything We Could Hope For-Or Perhaps Fear, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 21,
2005, at C-8.
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involving the lives of celebrity athletes and entertainers-private in the
sense of not pertaining to matters that relate to carrying out their duties
as public performers. 10 1 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in
New York Times drew a line between the public and private life of a
public official and made clear that the stricter actual malice standard
only applies to defamatory
falsehoods of public officials relating to their
"official conduct." 10 2
1. The Public Figure "Double Standard" Created by the Media
Studies show that sports editors operate by a different set of norms
from those of other parts of the newsroom, and that many sports
departments do not even follow a journalism ethics code. 103 While
evidence suggests that ethics are discussed among editors within sports
departments, albeit on an infrequent basis, 104 the pertinent questions
are: What ethical issues are editors discussing? What ethical standards
are editors self-imposing upon their journalism practices? Are editors
in fact adhering to those standards? The evidence suggests that today's
sports news reporting is different than in the past in many respects. A
recent analysis of 1,141 articles involving different cases of sports
reporting in four different German daily newspapers, on five highprofile German athletes, from different periods of time, suggests that:
(1) today the status of the athlete counts far more than it did in the past,
and that the media's focus is not just on the athlete himself but also on
other protagonists such as the coach, the psychologist, and others
101. This reference to private matters should not be confused with matters so private that one
desires to keep them secret because it would be highly offensive if the matters were disclosed,
which may result in a right of privacy tort
cause of action.
102. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279, 280-83 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct .... We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official
conduct.").
103. See, e.g., Marie Hardin, Survey Finds Boosterism, Freebies Remain Problem for
Newspaper Sports Departments, 26 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 66, 66 (2005) ("[S]ports departments still
vary in their use of ethical codes and professional standards ...[and] [siports editors, especially
those at small-circulation dailies, may operate by a set of norms not acceptable in other parts of
the newsroom."). Out of 285 participating newspapers, Hardin's survey revealed that fifty-six
percent of the editors indicated that their staffs follow an ethics code. Id.
104. When editors were asked in Hardin's survey to indicate how often ethics are discussed in
their sports departments, six percent of editors said that ethics are discussed every day, twenty-six
percent said less than once a month, thirty percent said once or twice a week, and thirty-seven
percent said once or twice a month. Id. However, forty-three percent of editors with more than
thirty years experience responded that ethical issues were rarely or never discussed. Id.
According to Hardin, "Given the importance of such discussions to promoting ethical behavior
and the likelihood that editors are faced with ethical quandaries daily, whether they recognize
them as such or not, lack of dialogue could promote poor decision-making." id.
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associated with the athlete; (2) today's media is looking for interesting
stories with public appeal, and there are no longer any clear limits
regarding privacy and intimacy; (3) today the journalists' opinions and
reporting of objective information are not sufficiently separated; and (4)
and a decline in
statistics are showing a lack of accurate research
05
journalists exercising their duty to work carefully. 1
The media's treatment of athletes and entertainers has impacted
society's treatment of them as well. The mainstream news media has
essentially created a different standard for participants in the sports and
entertainment industries, which largely influences how society
perceives and treats these individuals.10 6 A media that heavily criticizes
and "judges" people fuels a society that does the same. Two days after
Jacksonville Jaguars' wide receiver Matt Jones told reporters during
training camp that he was "embarrassed" over his recent arrest on
cocaine charges, the press reported under the headline, Not-So-Warm
Welcome, that "it didn't take long for hecklers to come after Jaguars
wide receiver Matt Jones, who said Friday he was 'embarrassed' over
his recent arrest on felony cocaine charges but hasn't apologized." 10 7 In
the article, the newspaper highlighted the fact that a fan wearing a Tshirt imprinted with Jones's mug shot snuck behind a fence where the
players were working and taunted Jones. 10 8 This news report went
beyond informing the public that Jones had been charged and arrested.
It implicitly criticized Jones for not making a public apology for his
arrest, or, at a minimum, insinuated that a public apology was warranted
by Jones. Thus, the press was holding Jones to a different set of rules
and standards than exist for other individuals in society, who are not
expected to publicly apologize for being arrested. Perhaps Jones's
lawyers advised him that a public apology could be deemed an
admission and detrimental in the pending criminal case against him, or
perhaps Jones just simply did not feel that he owed society an apology.
In addition, there are some questions raised by the reporting of the

105. Josef Hackforth & Simone Schlegel, Ethics in Sports-Journalism? On (Sportive)
Fairness in Press Coverage, AUDI INST. FOR SPORTS COMM., July 11, 2007, available at
http://www.audi-institut-sportkommunikation.de/press/index.phpid=160&tree=-6-29-&ebene=2.
106. Jim Fisher, Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Utah, commented,
"You get this hero-worship of athletes which leads to 'jockitis' in high school and to a certain
extent in college, too. Athletes are simply held to a different standard than others in society. In
sports reporting, you've generally seen a whole different ethical standard." Holly Mullen, KUTV
Sports Anchor's Legal Snarl Says Something Bigger About Squishy Ethics in Sports Journalism,
SALTLAKECITYWEEKLY.NET, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/article-5570-news
_media-out-foxed.html.
107. Michael C. Wright, Not-So-Warm Welcome, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 27, 2008, at C-8.
108. Id.
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heckling fan incident. Is it acceptable to show up at an individual's
place of work and publicly "taunt" that person for their mishaps or
misdeeds, let alone wear a shirt with that person's mug shot? Through
the media's constant criticizing and highlighting of the mishaps and
misdeeds of professional athletes and entertainers, has the media
convinced society that it is acceptable to do so the same?
The media's constant scrutiny of athletes and entertainers has even
influenced judges in their opinions. For example, in a lease dispute
between the Seattle Supersonics and the City of Seattle regarding the
applicability of an arbitration clause, the judge stated in the ruling:
"[The owners'] attempt to side-step Article II and shoot for Article
XXVI is as errant as a typical Shaquille O'Neal free throw." 10 9 O'Neal
was not a party to the case, he did not play for the Sonics, and his skills
as a basketball player were obviously irrelevant to the issue in the case,
but the judge publicly and openly criticized O'Neal's free throw
shooting ability. Perhaps the judge felt it would add some light humor
to the opinion. Should this personal insult be shrugged off on the
grounds that "it's just sports"? Regardless, it appears to be an
acceptable norm for a judge, in a written opinion, to criticize a high
profile professional athlete in the performance of his job duties. But it
would most certainly not be acceptable for a judge to do so with other
people in society. Indeed, a judge would not even criticize a highprofile person such as Bill Gates in the performance of his duties,
especially if Gates was not a party in the case.
Sometimes such criticism from judges is more subtle, such as when
they hold professional athletes to a different standard by citing the fact
that they are highly compensated. As part of the basis for rejecting a
right of publicity claim by major league baseball players in the
unauthorized use of their names and performance statistics by fantasy
sports leagues, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C.
Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.l l0 indicated that "major league baseball players are
rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can
earn additional large sums from endorsements and sponsorship
arrangements."'' In essence, the court was of the view that the players
do not "deserve" to be compensated when fantasy leagues use their
names and performance statistics, in part, because they already make
109. City of Seattle v. Prof I Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620RSM, 2007 WL 3217556,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2007).
110. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
111. Id.
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enough money."12 Here again, why was the court creating a different
standard under the law for athletes from other individuals in society
who are highly compensated? Perhaps the media's frequent criticism of
player salaries has influenced judges in their decision-making. A
Florida newspaper columnist added his "two cents" in connection with
reporting a few recent signings in professional baseball:
It really is a testament to the craziness of baseball salaries (heck, of all
sports) that these pay raises barely raise an eyebrow. I mean, there
really is some kind of disconnect between pro athletes and the public.
Especially when millions of dollars are being thrown around for, let's
face it, just doing your job.
Only in pro sports can you do your job
1 13
just OK and be rewarded.
The media has also created a different standard for athletes and
entertainers as it relates to their expectations of privacy. Sports is
entirely unique as the only industry whereby the press interviews
subjects in their dressing rooms, which implicitly suggests that the news
media views sports participants as having a diminished privacy interest
from that of others in society, and that the public has a "right of access"
to them anytime. 114 Simply, there are no privacy limits when it comes
to sports participants, even when the matter involves an unknown
athlete and it is obvious that the athlete does not want the matter
disclosed to the public. For example, in a lawsuit brought by a cyclist
112. The district court in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. made similar comments:

"[T]he additional inducement for achievement produced by publicity rights are often
inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already
handsomely compensated .... [F]or example.., major league baseball players' salaries currently
average over one million dollars per year." C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (quoting Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996)). "Indeed,
professional athletes have responsibility for their celebrity status based on their athletic
achievements; their fame, however, is nonetheless 'largely [a] creation of the media or the
audience."' Id. (quoting Cardtoons,95 F.3d at 975).
113. Michael Cummings, 2 Cents, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 21, 2008, at C-2.
114. The press blasted New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady when he left the locker
room after practice during the week prior to the Super Bowl before reporters had the chance to
question him about a photo that surfaced depicting Brady with his girlfriend, super model Gisele
Bundchen, walking around Manhattan with his foot in a walking boot. Jarrett Bell, The Bell
Tolls: Brady Drama Is Great Super Bowl Hype, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/footbal/nfl/2008-01-25-the-bell-tollsN.htm#uslPageRetum.
Upset about not getting access to Brady, Bell instead chose to criticize Brady:
At least there was evidence of his presence. A pair of tired-looking jeans lay folded
over a chair in front of Brady's locker. It looked like a wallet bulged from the back
pocket. A fat wallet, fitting for a GQ quarterback worth millions. No one dared to
touch those pants. They'd probably get caught on camera.
Id. In the article, Bell twice tried to justify such tabloid "Brady Drama" as a newsworthy event
because Brady was the league MVP, a three-time Super Bowl MVP, and the Patriots had an 18-0
record. Id.
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claiming that the United States Anti-Doping Agency broke its own rules
and damaged him in connection with a doping investigation, the
plaintiff sealed his identity and filed the lawsuit as "John Doe" in order
to prevent his name from being widely circulated. 1 15 Two days after the
lawsuit was filed, the press published the identity of the plaintiff,
obtained the plaintiff's cell phone number, and called the plaintiff to
inquire about the lawsuit. 1 16 While it is not entirely clear why, the
expectation of privacy of athletes and entertainers has increasingly
diminished in recent years. According to one sports editor, "In the past,
as long as it didn't interfere with what was going on on the field,
' 117
[reporters] kept it to themselves .... Now it's open season."
One would certainly believe that the subject matter of statements
made by an individual to a psychologist would be off limits to the press.
But apparently that is not the case when the individual is a professional
athlete. A Nashville newspaper published information from a police
report it obtained that Tennessee Titans quarterback Vince Young
"mentioned suicide several times" to a psychologist. 1 18 The publication
stated that the psychologist determined that Young was depressed and
expressed concerns about his safety to the team. 1 19 The publication
further stated that when Young abruptly left home later in his Mercedes
with a gun and without his cell phone, Titans coach Jeff Fisher was
alerted and he contacted the police to inform them about information
that he had received from the psychologist. 120 The publication directly
quoted the officer's statements in the police report: "I asked him
(Fisher), 'What made her worry about him?' He stated, 'His mood, his
emotions, he is injured, he wants to quit, and he mentioned suicide
several times."' 12 1 This press release raises a smorgasbord of
journalism ethics issues and questions. Is there a legitimate public
interest in the publication of this information? Is the justification for
publication that professional athletes seek attention (e.g. by endorsing
products) or assume a position of notoriety and, thereby, "assume the
risk" that every aspect of their private lives will be exposed by the
115. Eddie Pells, 'John Doe' ID'd in Lawsuit Against USADA, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 26,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/cycling/2008-01-26-usada-leograndeN.htm.
116. Id.
117. Teddy Greenstein, Tabloids Change Rules on Athletes: Coverage of A-Rod's Personal
Life Shows New Philosophy, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2007, at Sports 2.
118. Jim Wyatt, Police: Suicide Talks Prompted Search for Titans' Young, TENNESSEAN,
reprinted in USATODAY.COM, Sept. 13, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/
titans/2008-09-12-young-searchN.htm.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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media? Is the justification for publication that the public is entitled to
know about a player's thoughts of suicide revealed to his psychologist
because it tangentially relates to the player's performance on the field?
Is the justification for publication that professional athletes are "role
models"? Even if one takes the position that there is a legitimate public
interest in this information (albeit slight at best), the pertinent issue is
whether the public interest outweighs Young's high privacy interest in
confidentiality.
What if the police report is inaccurate? As it turns out, the very next
day it was reported that, according to Fisher, the police report contained
many inaccuracies, including the fact that (1) Young's local marketing
manager, Mike Mu, called the team psychologist with the alarm that
Young had left his home without his cell phone, threatening to quit, and
was speeding down the interstate with a gun in his car after talking to
Mu (not the psychologist) about suicide and (2) the team psychologist,
in turn, called Fisher with Mu's account but she never spoke directly
with Young, as indicated in the police report, until the end of the
night. 122 As to Young's state of mind regarding possible suicide, Fisher
said, "I don't buy it," and he was irritated with Mu's involvement with
Young. 123 Journalists have an ethical obligation to seek the truth, which
entails a discipline of verification-seeking out multiple witnesses,
disclosing as much as possible about sources, or asking various sides for
comment. 124 This "is what separates journalism from other modes of
' 12 5
communication, such as propaganda, fiction or entertainment."
Before publishing the information in the police report, the accuracy of
the report could have been verified by merely picking up the phone and
asking Fisher whether the police report was accurate as to what Fisher
told the police. Instead, the economic incentives in today's news media
marketplace have created an environment in which reporters are
vigorously competing to be the first to get the story out. This "report it
and fix it later" mentality simply does not square with journalism ethics
principles.
Without an external mechanism to encourage the press to adhere to
journalism ethics standards, tabloid journalism will continue to progress
and evolve. This is evident by the press's recent quest to go beyond the
athlete or entertainer and report trivial information about the friends and
122. Chris Mortensen, Fisher Says Young Needs Time to Learn from Collins, ESPN.COM,
Sept. 14, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3586215.
123. Id.
124. See supra Part II.A (discussing reporting truthful and accurate information).
125. See Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle 3 (discussing
journalism's essence as a discipline of verification).
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family members of celebrities. An example is the media hysteria
surrounding Michael Phelps's accomplishments at the 2008 Summer
Olympics in Beijing, which went far beyond reporting on Phelps's
athletic achievements and other events occurring at the site of the
Olympics. As the entire world watched a proud mother and her
daughters support Phelps in his quest to achieve something that no other
Olympic athlete has ever done, the press surreptitiously gathered
information as to the whereabouts of Phelps's "delinquent" father in
search for a reason for what the press considered a lack of support on
his part. 126 Does the public need to know that Phelps's father is a state
trooper, divorced his mother fifteen years ago, and since then remarried
and had little contact with Phelps? 127 The proliferation of tabloid
journalism in the traditional media sources prompts the question of what
important information and events are we not being told, or are we not
focusing on, when the press is diverting our attention to trivial
information? Phelps's father voluntarily chose to avoid the public
scrutiny of his estranged relationship with his son, but the press
completely disregarded his privacy interest in doing so. Another
question raised by the proliferation of tabloid journalism is whether the
media's constant focus on criticism, speculation, and triviality fosters a
society that does the same.
The media treats athletes and entertainers differently from other
members of society. There are two oft-asserted justifications for
athletes and entertainers to be subjected to different standards by the
media: (1) that they are "role models" and (2) that they assume the risk
of different treatment by voluntarily choosing to become an athlete or
entertainer.
a. "Role Model" Status
The "role model" justification is that athletes and entertainers are
obligated, or have a responsibility, to adhere to a certain standard of
behavior and, because of that, the public has the right to be informed
about what they are doing in their personal, non-public, lives. In
reference to a story in the New York Post with the front-page headline
"STRAY-ROD . . . Alex Hits Strip Club with Mystery Blonde," one

sports editor told ChicagoSports.com:
Here you have the highest-paid player in the game who put out a
children's book earlier this year. Some of these people are buying his
126. Chris Chase, The Mystery of Michael Phelps' Missing Father,YAHOO! SPORTS, Aug. 20,

2008,

http://sports.yahoo.com/olympics/beijing/blog/fourth-place-medal/post/The-mystery-of-

Michael-Phelps-missing-father?um=oly, 102215.
127. See id. (discussing Michael Phelps's family troubles).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

jerseys and looking at him as a role model. I'm not so sure parents
will appreciate that some28of their sons want to be like A-Rod when
they see things like this. 1
Another sports writer agreed: "Ballplayers better understand . . .[that]
their sex lives and off-the-field conduct may hold far more import with
29
the general public than their batting or earned-run averages." 1
In recent years, role model status has even been utilized as a basis in
judicial decisionmaking. 13° For example, in a perjury case, when
Federal District Judge Kenneth Karas gave former Olympic gold
medalist Marion Jones the maximum sentence recommended under
Jones's plea deal, he said in court that the use of performance-enhancing
drugs "sends all the wrong messages to all who follow the athlete's
every move. Athletes in society have an elevated status. They
entertain, they inspire and, perhaps most important, they serve as role
models." 13 1 Judge Karas also said he gave Jones the maximum under
the plea deal to send a message to athletes who have abused drugs and
overlooked the values of "hard work, dedication, teamwork and
sportsmanship."' 13 2 He further commented that the wide use of steroids
"affects the integrity of athletic competition."' 13 3 It is clear from the
judge's comments that, in deciding Jones's sentence, he was holding her
to different standard as a high profile athlete. Not only was Jones being
held to a different and higher standard, but merely her status as a high
profile athlete formed part of the basis of her prison sentence-her
status was being used to "send a message" to other athletes.
Judge Karas is not the only judge to have used a celebrity's role
model status as a basis for a legal outcome. In Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,1 34 the California Supreme Court considered
the role model status of athletes and entertainers in weighing First
Amendment considerations against a state right of publicity claim in
128. Greenstein, supra note 117 (quoting Leon Carter, sports editor of the New York Daily
News).
129. Id. (quoting Bill Madden, New York Daily News columnist).
130. In commending Andy Pettitte for admitting in an affidavit to having used human growth
hormones, Henry Waxman, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, proclaimed that "Mr. Pettitte's consistency makes him a role model on and off the field."
Ronald Blum, Pettitte Admits Using HGH in 2004, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 13, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.consports/baseball/2008-02-13 -pettitte-affadavitN.htm?POE=click-refer.
131. Marion Jones Sentenced to 6 Months in Prison, NBCSPORTS.COM, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://nbcsports.msnbc.con-/id/22508286/.
132. Six-Month Jail Sentence for Jones, BBCNEWS.CO.UK, Jan.
11, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas7l82969.stm.
133. Traci Billingsley, Jones Turns Herself in to Federal Prison, USAToDAY.COM, Mar. 7,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-03-07-jones-prison-N.htm.
134. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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connection with the unauthorized use of their identities for commercial
purposes:
Entertainment and sports celebrities are the leading players in our
Public Drama. We tell tales, both tall and cautionary, about them. We
monitor their comings and goings, their missteps and heartbreaks. We
copy their mannerisms, their styles, their modes of conversation and
of consumption. Whether or not celebrities are 'the chief agents of
moral change in the United States,' they certainly are widely usedfar more than are institutionally anchored elites-to symbolize
individual aspirations, group identities, and cultural values. Their
images are thus important expressive and communicative resources:
the peculiar, yet familiar idiom in which we conduct
a fair portion of
135
conversation.
everyday
and
business
cultural
our
Considering the role model status of an athlete or entertainer to assess
the validity of a right of publicity claim may be warranted because such
claim is not based upon notions of "privacy," but is based upon notions
of unjust enrichment flowing from the economic value in their public
identities and personas. Thus, to the extent a third party is using the
public identity or persona of a celebrity (i.e. their names and likenesses)
in an expressive context, First Amendment considerations may warrant
protecting such speech over the celebrity's economic interest in his or
her identity or persona. 136 Examples of uses involving expressive
speech protected by the First Amendment include use of a celebrity's
name or likeness in entertainment and other creative works (fiction and
nonfiction), in news reporting, and in print or broadcast biographies,
novels, plays, or motion pictures. 137 Even though the third party in
these contexts is reaping the economic value by using the celebrity's
identity, the celebrity's right to be compensated for such use of his or
her public identity is outweighed by the high social value of the third
party's expressive use. Thus, there is a plausible legal justification for
courts to acknowledge and consider the role model status of celebrities
in the context of evaluating right of publicity claims as the court did in
Comedy III.
135. Id. at 803 (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 128 (1993)).
136. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing protected speech under the First
Amendment using a celebrity's name or likeness).
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (2005) (discussing the
use of name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's identity used for purposes of trade in news,
entertainment, and creative works). See also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,
930-31 (6th Cir. 2003) (following Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 in
determining that Ohio is "inclined to give substantial weight to the public interest in freedom of
expression when balancing it against the personal and proprietary interests recognized by the right
of publicity").
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But there is questionable validity in a judge basing a sentencing
decision on the celebrity defendant's status as a role model. In that
context, the judge is imposing a harsher criminal sanction upon an
individual on the basis that the celebrity defendant did not live up to a
different and elevated standard of behavior specifically created for high
profile athletes, which raises many questions. Who, by definition,
constitutes a role model? What defines role model status is entirely
subjective, and many would say that merely possessing a superior skill
does not emulate the qualities and characteristics of a role model.
Although a segment of the population may view athletes as "heroes" on
the field and may admire superior athletic skill and performance, and
even that premise is accepted, it does not lead to the conclusion that all,
or a portion of that segment of society, also views them as role models.
Indeed, perhaps athletes and entertainers are not, in fact, role models at
all but have merely been portrayed as such by the media. One
commentator, a psychological consultant to many college and Olympic
teams, believes that the media helps "to create images of players as
gods," and that "[t]oo often television, newspapers and magazines
mythologize athletes giving an illusion that they have some kind of
superior integrity when in reality they aren't much different than anyone
else."' 13 8 Does a role model include the unknown high school or
collegiate athlete who suddenly becomes "known" solely because the
media publicizes a matter entirely unrelated to his or her athletic
performance?
Even if the premise is accepted that athletes are role models, there are
further concerns raised by Judge Karas's use of role model status as a
basis for his sentencing decision. Other "role models" in society, such
as doctors, teachers and firemen, are not typically held to different and
elevated standards under the law or treated differently under sentencing
guidelines as well. How is the standard of behavior defined for a
particular role model? If criminal sanctions are determined on the basis
that the elevated standard of behavior for a role model was not met, that
standard should be clearly defined somewhere. But more importantly,
"integrity of athletic competition," which is a purely a sporting concern,
arguably should not even be a consideration for a judge in a prison
sentencing decision. Indeed, it is astounding that Judge Karas used
Jones to "send a message" to other athletes who have "overlooked the
' 139
values of 'hard work, dedication, teamwork and sportsmanship."
138. See Carpenter, supra note 95 (discussing professional athletes who risked their lives and
reputations by breaking laws and not playing by the rules).
139. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing Marion Jones's six-month
sentence in jail after lying to investigators about using performance-enhancing drugs and her role
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Perhaps the media's relentless coverage of performance-enhancing
drugs influenced Judge Karas's decision in sentencing Marion Jones.
Regardless, it is fundamentally unfair for a judge to interject
competitive balance in sports as well as concepts of hard work,
dedication, teamwork, and sportsmanship as a justification or basis for
critical decisions regarding the extent of an individual's fundamental
right to liberty and freedom.
If the premise is accepted that a celebrity's role model status has legal
relevance in some contexts (e.g., right of publicity claims) but not in
others (e.g., sentencing decisions), then similar distinctions can be
drawn between legitimate and illegitimate use and treatment of public
figures by the media as well. As previously noted, in the context of
right of publicity claims, role model status may support First
Amendment protection involving a third party's unauthorized use of a
celebrity's public identity and persona in certain contexts. However,
that same justification does not apply to third party disclosure and use
of private information concerning celebrities. When a celebrity is
claiming a violation of privacy as a result of the media's disclosure of
private facts, the relevant legal consideration is whether the information
or event is newsworthy, and not whether the plaintiff is a role model.
To the extent the news media justifies its coverage of athletes and
entertainers not on the basis that the information or event is newsworthy
but because the people involved are role models, it can create
fundamental problems from a journalism ethics standpoint. When the
media is concerned about the role model status of its subjects, the news
necessarily becomes much more trivial and, thus, more "tabloid" in
nature. The coverage tends to be more critical and negative of the
celebrity's personal life, rather than focusing on the individual's public
performance and persona. 140 Furthermore, when the news media uses
role model status as a basis for its coverage, it is de-emphasizing any
privacy interest of the celebrity and focusing more on "shock value;" in
other words, "Look what we found out about this individual!" The end
result is that the press is losing sight of its ethical obligation to avoid
sensationalism and trivia as well as to protect the privacy interest of its
subjects. 141
in a check-fraud scam).
140. See, e.g., Jags' Jones Has Hearing Monday on Cocaine Charge, CBSSPORTS.COM,
Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/10927258/sportsprofileplus ("Jacksonville
Jaguars receiver Matt Jones has been getting notice in training camp for his improved
performance. However, his cocaine bust remains the primary reason his name is in the
headlines.").
141. According to Tim McGuire, Professor of Business Journalism at Arizona State
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b. Assuming a Position of Notoriety
The second commonly asserted justification for the media subjecting
athletes and entertainers to a different standard is that that they assume
the risk of different treatment by voluntarily choosing to become a
public figure. 14 2 It is often asserted that, by merely engaging in the
activity of an athlete or entertainer, these individuals take on a
responsibility to conduct their private lives according to a particular
standard, which relates back to the role model issue. But, in addition, it
is asserted that they "assume the risk" that matters relating to their
public and private lives will be exposed by the media-even inaccurately
at times. So the assumption of risk argument goes, "if you do not want
this special treatment, then do not become a public figure." Proponents
of this argument reason that public figures must take the good with the
bad and they cannot have it both ways-if they want to benefit and
profit from having their achievements and accomplishments highlighted
and exposed by the media, they cannot expect their mishaps and
misdeeds in their personal lives to go unscathed. But this reasoning is
an emotionally-based opinion, and is not supported by any
sound public
policy rationale.
The assumption of risk argument is most likely a byproduct of the
United States Supreme Court's rationale for extending the stricter actual
malice standard to public figures in defamation actions-that the public
figure has greater access to the media and therefore greater opportunity
to rebut defamatory statements, and that those who have become public
figures have done so voluntarily and therefore "invite attention and
comment." 14 3 However, the actual malice standard addresses the
conditions under which the press will be liable in civil damages for
inaccurate statements. The rationale for differential treatment of public
figures in defamation actions is based on the notion that the press

University's Walter Cronkite's School of Journalism and Mass Communications:
The mandate to "do no harm," or at least minimize harm, gets kicked around pretty
brutally in sports coverage. I am sure some of the players implicated in the steroids
scandals are going to be pretty surprised that sports media tries to avoid doing harm. I
sometimes argue to my students that the media seems to take a "celebrity" exception
when it comes to many ethical standards in celebrity coverage. I fear that mirage of an
"exception" is starting to apply to sports. Privacy is another ethical concept getting
banged around pretty hard in sports journalism. Witness Alex Rodriguez' alleged
affair. At the Star Tribune many years ago we heard many stories about alleged
bedroom escapades of a star player, but we never saw the relevance. Apparently
relevance has become quaint.
McGuire on Media, http://cronkite.asu.edu/mcguireblog/?p=36 (Mar. 2, 2009, 5:47 pm).
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
143. Id. at 345.
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should be shielded from civil damages so that it is encouraged to
vigorously report on matters involving public figures without fear of
liability if the report ends up being inaccurate without the press's
knowledge. While the assumption of risk argument may have validity
when asserted by the press as a shield from exposure to liability in
defamation actions, it should not be used as a sword to expose the
misdeeds and mishaps of celebrities simply because they are public
figures. In addition, while the assumption of risk argument may have a
bearing on the defamation issue, it simply has no relevance or
application to journalists' ethical responsibilities and the concerns that
accompany tabloid journalism-unsubstantiated reporting, citing
unnamed sources, speculation, sensationalism, triviality, and disregard
for privacy. In other words, despite the defamation standard which
provides that the press must not knowingly (or recklessly) report
inaccurate information pertaining to matters involving public figures,
the ethical obligation of the press requires it to make every effort to
report truthfully and accurately and to diligently verify the information,
which is lacking in today's news reporting.144
The "tabloidization" of news reporting in the sports and
entertainment industry has already taken hold. The important question
for society, journalists and the legal system is to what extent tabloid
journalism should be permitted to infiltrate news reporting. Indeed, the
data indicates that a majority of Americans have already lost faith in the
traditional mainstream news sources. 145 Journalism itself is not capable
of ethical self-regulation. The next section will demonstrate that the
combination of financial pressures and an increasing level of corporate
influence have made it necessary in the twenty-first century to revisit
current tort standards and provide appropriate incentives for the press to
144. See Felicity Barringer, Sports Reporting: Rules on Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002,
at C6 ("[R]igorous attribution rules are relaxed when journalists are reporting accusations of
corrupt deals in a world like figure skating, which has a reputation for unsavory dealings.").
145.

See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, NEWS AUDIENCES

INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED 4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 PEW STUDY], available at http:/peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/215.pdf ("More than half (53%) agree with the statement 'I often don't trust
what news organizations are saying.' Nearly as many (48%) believe people who decide on news
content are 'out of touch."'). See also Christine Urban, Am, Soc'y of Newspaper Editors
(ASNE), Tracking Public Attitudes, in BUILDING READER TRUST, Aug. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.asne.org/credibilityhandbook/brt/publicattitudes.htm (providing a 1999 study that
found that irrespective of the diversity in size, demography, and geography represented by eight
markets, more than eighty percent of adults in each market agreed with the statement "I believe
that newspapers frequently overdramatize some news stories just to sell more papers," and more
than two-thirds believed that "Lately I have become more skeptical about the accuracy of
anything I hear or read in the news"). Amazingly, "69 percent say newspapers are 'concerned
mainly with making profits' rather than the public interest (up 12 percentage points from 1998)."
Id.
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adhere to journalism ethics codes. 146
IV. CURRENT MARKET FORCES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO REGULATE
JOURNALISM ETHICS

News reporting is a business, and it always has been. But the notion
that free market principles, in which news media outlets vigorously
compete for the attention of an audience, can sufficiently regulate
journalism ethics is flawed. The free market concept is first based on
the assumption that an audience prefers an ethical press and seeks out
information that is both newsworthy and truthful. 147 This leads to a
second assumption that if the media perceives that to be the case, then
the media will regulate its behavior to attain these ends out of a desire to
garner higher ratings and thereby maximize profits. 14 8
These
assumptions are oxymoronic. First, the press decides for the public
what information is newsworthy and truthful, so the public does not
have the capability to seek out information that is newsworthy and
truthful-the public simply takes what the media gives it. Moreover, to
implicitly suggest that the public can choose between ethical news
providers and ones that are not so ethical is flawed. If the news is not
newsworthy and truthful, and if the providers of it are not acting
ethically, then it is not news. Second, higher ratings and profits are
generated by getting the audience's attention, which may or may not
include publication of newsworthy and truthful information. If these
assumptions are in fact true, unfortunately it means that the media
apparently perceives that the public does not necessarily prefer an
ethical press but prefers one that is more tabloid in nature. Is the
media's perception accurate?
A 2004 survey of three thousand adults conducted by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press revealed that a majority of
Americans are only "moderately" interested in the traditional "hard
news" subjects consisting of international affairs, politics, local
government, and business and finance, and that approximately one-inten Americans (thirteen percent) have absolutely no interest in these

146. See infra Part IV (arguing that current market forces are not enough to regulate
journalism ethics),
147. See Morant, supra note 7, at 605 ("An audience generally prefers information that is both
newsworthy and truthful.").
148. See id. ("If media perceives that the dissemination of truthful and universally appealing
information enlarges its audience (and, therefore, maximizes profits), then it will regulate its
behavior to attain these ends. Those media sources that provide news and information that
audiences seek will generally garner higher ratings.").
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subjects. 14 9 More significantly, less than one-third of Americans
(thirty-one percent) even follow hard news stories on a consistent basis,
and of those who follow these stories consistently, one half prefer indepth analysis and the other half prefer headlines plus some coverage of
the facts or just headlines. 150
Furthermore, the availability and
abundance of twenty-four hour on-demand news sources has resulted in
an increase in the number of people who cram the news into their busy
schedules by "checking in from time to time" as opposed to getting the
news at a regular time each day, which appears to be an increasing trend
with the younger generation. 15 1 The public's attention span for the
news also appears to be affected by cable television:
[F]ewer than one-in-four Americans (23%) are steady news watchers,
saying they watch on a regular schedule and don't flip channels [and]
[a]t the other end of the spectrum are 33% who truly graze the newschecking in from time to time when convenient, and ready 15
to2 change
the channel whenever they don't find the subject interesting.
The survey also asked participants whether they preferred news that is
"enjoyable and entertaining" and forty-eight percent responded that they
like it that way, forty-five percent responded that it does not matter, and
15 3
only six percent responded that they dislike it that way.
Based on the foregoing data regarding consumers' preferred content,
as well as the desired form of the content, presenting the news as
"infotainment" makes the most business sense for the media from a
purely market driven perspective. 154 An alarming survey of journalists
conducted in 1999 revealed that "[t]wo-thirds of those in national and
local news say that news organizations' attempts to attract readers or
15 5
viewers has pushed them toward infotainment instead of news."
Perhaps even more disturbing, a March 2008 survey of journalists
conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed that financial and
business bottom-line pressure is now the overriding concern among
149. 2004 PEW STUDY, supra note 145, at 27.
150. Id.
151. Id. at29.
152. Id. at 29-30.
153. Id. at 32.
154. See Jill Rosen, Et Tu, "Nightline"?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.-Mar. 2004, at 20-23
(noting that, due to today's celebrity-obsessed media market, it is not surprising that Nightline
bumped coverage of President Bush's trip to London for coverage of Michael Jackson's arrest for
child molestation, which became the program's highest-rated show of the year).
155.

PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, STRIKING THE BALANCE,

AUDIENCE INTERESTS, BUSINESS PRESSURES AND JOURNALISTS' VALUES SECTION IH: VIEWS
ON PERFORMANCE (1999), available at http://people-press.org/report/67/striking-the-balanceaudience-interests-business-pressures-and-journalists-values
(follow "Section Im. Views on
Performance").
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journalists. 156
Approximately two-thirds of national and local
journalists believe that increased bottom-line pressure is not only
changing the way news organizations operate but is seriously hurting
157
the quality of news coverage, and that the pressure is intensifying.
Moreover, sixty-two percent of national journalists in the 2008 Pew
Survey said that journalism is going in the wrong direction, compared
with fifty-one percent in 2004.158 The 2008 Pew Survey also shows
that. slightly less than fifty percent of national and local internet
journalists believe that both corporate media owners and advertisers
have a great deal or fair amount of influence over coverage, which is a
very significant percentage considering that most of the internet
journalists in the sample work for the online operations of traditional
news outlets. 159 As noted by one commentator, "[i]t comes as no
surprise, therefore, that 80% of journalists surveyed feel that market
pressures often kill relevant or socially pertinent stories that are judged
160
as dull or less attention-grabbing."'
While some commentators have posited that profit maximization
affords proper incentives for the press to engage in the positive behavior
that journalism ethics codes promote, 16 1 the evidence from the 2008
Pew Survey demonstrates that free market principles cannot sufficiently
regulate journalism ethics. As the press continues to be confronted with
increasing competition in the marketplace, as well as increasing
financial pressures, journalism ethics will continue to spiral
downward. 16 2 Simply, profit maximization and social values butt heads
with each other. 163 As the incentive to maximize profits leads to the
press's quest for sensationalism and increased readership, it decreases
the media's incentive to enforce their own journalism ethics codes,

156.

PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, FINANCIAL WOES Now

OVERSHADOW ALL OTHER CONCERNS FOR JOURNALISTS 5 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 PEW
STUDY], availableat http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/403.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Morant, supra note 7, at 626-27.
161. See id. at 630-33 (arguing that profit-maximization is a fundamental incentive for
positive ethical behavior in journalism).
162. See Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the FirstAmendment for the Rest
of Us?, 9 J. DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (1998) ("The pressure to maintain or
boost circulation and broadcast ratings in a marketplace with ever increasing competitive
pressures may tend to make serious journalists more tabloid-like.").
163. See Robert M. Entman & Steven S. Wildman, Reconciling Economic and Non-Economic
Perspectives on Media Policy: Transcending the "Marketplace of Ideas," 42 J. COMM. 5, 5-6
(1992) (promoting economic efficiency and social values simultaneously under the umbrella of
the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor results in bad policy and a flawed policy analysis).
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often leading to compromised privacy interests, inaccurate reporting,
and incomplete source verification.1 64 The increased competition for
audience and ratings overshadows the objectives of journalism ethics
codes. 16 5 While it appears that advertisers are decreasing their spending
in traditional media, they are increasing their spending in tabloid
magazines, 166 which adds pressure on the traditional media outlets to be
more "tabloid" in nature in order to attract advertising dollars. 167 As a
result of these market forces, economic pressures, and budget
constraints, as well as increased competition and quest for higher
ratings, the journalist becomes caught in an ethical quagmire in
attempting to balance what the public wants to know and what it needs
to know. 16 8 When only forty percent of journalists themselves believe
164. See Marge Injasoulian & Gregory L. Leisse, Media Crises, 36 CATH. LAW. 97, 106-07
(1995) (noting that the hysteria surrounding the press's quest for sensationalism and, thus,
increased readership and viewership, often leads to "inaccurate reporting and incomplete source
verification"). The link between sensationalism and inaccurate reporting and incomplete source
verification is evident in sports news reporting, as demonstrated by recent reports on the steroid
controversy in baseball:
The Los Angeles Times was forced to issue a correction and apology for getting the
names wrong in a story about Jason Grimsley's testimony to federal investigators. One
of the names they messed up was Roger Clemens.' Contrary to what was reported in
October 2006, Clemens wasn't on the Grimsley affidavit, which was released
Thursday. And that L.A. Times story was cited in the Mitchell Report in the chapter
on Clemens .... There was also WNBC in New York, which put Albert Pujols and
Johnny Damon on the Mitchell Report based on a source hours before the report was
released. One big problem: They weren't on it.
Scott Kendrick, 2 Cents, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Dec. 23, 2007, at C-2. See also McGuire on Media,
http://cronkite.asu.edu/mcguireblog/?p=38 (Dec. 3, 2007, 4:39 pm) (discussing ESPN analyst
Kirk Herbstreit's violation of journalism ethical rules regarding use of confidential sources in
connection with inaccurately reporting that Louisiana State University head football coach Les
Miles and two of his assistants were leaving for the University of Michigan). As noted by
McGuire: "Too often sports reporters do not give careful attention to the motives of their sources
or the potential consequences of being wrong. One of the reasons for that may be the lack of
organizational consequences when a sports reporter is wrong in this kind of case." Id.
165. Morant, supra note 7, at 614.
166. See Jeremy Herron, An Economy Grows Around Britney Spears, USATODAY.COM, Jan.
29, 2008, http://www.usatoday.comlife/people/2008-01-28-britney-spears-economy-N.htm ("At
a time when advertising spending in traditional media is declining, celebrity gossip titles such as
Star, Us Weekly and In Touch Weekly are growing. That helped overall newsstand sales for
magazines edge 1% higher, to $2.39 billion, in the first half of 2007.").
167. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
2097 (1992) (discussing the impact that advertising has on the media).
168. See Andrew Calabrese, PoliticalSpace and the Trade in Television News, in TABLOID
TALES: GLOBAL DEBATES OVER MEDIA STANDARDS 43 (Colin Sparks & John Tulloch eds.,
2000) (discussing how the media increasingly relies on tabloid formats because of budget
constraints and competition); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive
Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 218 (1998) (noting
that news programs can get by with using questionable newsgathering techniques because they
are motivated by high ratings that result in higher profits); David A. Logan, Masked Media:
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that journalism is doing a good or excellent job at striking the
balance, 169 there is an inherent flaw created by the system. If the status
quo is maintained, the percentage of journalists who believe that
journalism is currently doing a good or excellent job of striking this
balance is likely to increase over time as a younger generation of
journalists, who generally seem less concerned about the commingling
of news and entertainment, continues to infiltrate the industry.170
Market forces in combination with state tort laws typically provide
proper incentives for corporate enterprises to comply with duties owed
to the public. For example, if the consumer is at risk of damage or
harm, manufacturers and service providers have an incentive to reduce
or eliminate that risk through adequate insurance or production of safer
products and services. The producer engages in a simple risk-burden
analysis, weighing the magnitude of a particular risk of harm to the
public against the cost or burden to the producer in reducing or
eliminating that risk. If the extent and magnitude of the risk of harm are
great, the producer has an incentive to take extra precautions and incur
the cost to alleviate the risk of liability. In essence, the duty of the
producer under tort negligence and strict liability standards normally
encourages, or at least attempts to encourage, the elimination or
reduction of risk of harm to the public.
Violation of journalism ethics principles imposes a risk of harm to
society at large to various extents and magnitudes. However, in the
journalism industry, market forces, in combination with tort law, do not
provide the press with the same incentives to minimize harm, protect
privacy, seek the truth, and avoid sensationalism and triviality.
Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REv. 161, 161-62

(1997) (noting that undercover reporting by newsmagazine programs raises serious journalism
ethics issues and has proliferated due to the media's quest for increased ratings and profits).
169. 2008 PEW STUDY, supra note 156, at 17.
170. Furthermore:
Unlike newsroom veterans, today's young journalism students seem less concerned
about the commingling of news, sports and entertainment, perhaps because they grew
up in an era dominated by large corporations. They seem to have a general
understanding that companies need to worry about investments such as broadcasting
rights in order to keep news operations in the black. "They seem to accept more of a
business sense. There is not this same outrage."
Kelly Heyboer, Fair Game?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 1999, at 46, 46-50 (quoting Bill

Evans, a media ethicist at Southern Methodist University). See also Hardin, supra note 103, at 67
("Younger journalists could represent a 'new breed with professional aspirations."' (quoting
Bruce Garrison & Michael Salwen, Newspaper Sports Journalists:A Profile of the "Profession,"

J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES, Fall 1989, at 57)). Hardin's survey revealed that "[e]ditors at smaller
papers, who were generally younger and less experienced, were less likely to see ethical problems
with freebies, were more likely to support boosterism and were more likely to work without a
code than were editors at larger papers." Id. at 71.
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Applying a risk-burden analysis, tort law does not threaten the media
with risk of liability because either (1) there is no duty to avoid any risk
of harm or (2) the duties of the press that are imposed (e.g. under
defamation or privacy tort laws) contain much more lenient standards of
care and are not consistent with the duties imposed under journalism
ethics codes and, thus, do not encourage the elimination of such risks.
Therefore, tort law would not appear to provide the press with the
necessary incentives to minimize harm to society posed by violating
journalism ethics codes. But, ironically, the cost or burden to the press
to alleviate the risk of harm through stricter adherence to journalism
ethics codes is minimal in comparison to the damage to society as a
whole that emulates from shoddy investigative practices, not identifying
sources, highlighting sensational and trivial items, inaccurate reporting,
and not respecting individuals' privacy. While state defamation laws
may afford relief to a targeted individual when the damage rises to the
level of a defamatory and false report, tort laws do not afford relief
when the resulting harm falls short of that level but ends up affecting an
entire society of people as opposed to a targeted individual.
The 2008 Pew Survey contains stark evidence that the journalism
marketplace in the twenty-first century is operating substantially
differently than in the past. 17 1 It is a significant turning point from a
legal standpoint. It should serve as a wake-up call to the legal
community that the social values journalism ethics codes seek to
promote simply cannot survive in today's economic and technological
environment in which media outlets are vigorously competing with one
another in print, cable television, internet, and real time platforms
amounting to thousands of available news sources. For the first time in
history, society is actually confused about basic questions concerning
what constitutes "news" and who are the legitimate sources of the news.
To be a viable enterprise in the twenty-first century's media
environment, the press is focused on how to best "grab the audience's
attention," which compromises journalism ethics principles.
The pertinent question for society is whether a competitive free
market system in the twenty-first century can effectively provide the
best quality news product. If news quality is measured by consumer
preference and/or higher ratings and profit maximization, then the
answer is most likely yes. But if we acknowledge that news is a
uniquely-situated product for which quality is instead measured by an
ethical component concerned about society's best interest that entails an
171. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing the 2008 Pew
Study).
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ethical duty of loyalty to the citizenry, then the answer is most likely no.
To put it a different way, journalism has reached a fork in the road and
the press simply cannot continue to operate in today's market
environment under the guise that it strictly adheres to a code of
journalism ethics principles. 172 The market environment has become
increasingly competitive, economically strained, and time-sensitive, and
the law must react accordingly to ensure, or at least encourage,
adherence to universally-adopted journalism ethics codes. However, if
the status quo is maintained and the press can continue to produce the
news in a virtually unrestrained free market under the First
Amendment's protective wings, the tabloid format of the news media
will only escalate. The next Part will propose how journalism ethics
codes can be incorporated into tort law standards without compromising
the First Amendment, and provide appropriate incentives for the press
17 3
to adhere to journalism ethics principles in a free market system.
V. INCORPORATING JOURNALISM ETHICS CODES INTO TORT LAW
STANDARDS WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
174
The Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
stated, "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other
virtues it cannot be legislated."' 175 However, press responsibility can
certainly be encouraged by the courts via their application of legal
standards and what considerations they take into account in the
application of those standards. Indeed, courts have recognized that
176
credibility is an essential component to the journalism product.
While press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, the basis
for constitutional protection of a free press becomes less compelling
when journalism lacks credibility. 17 7 As noted by Professor Clay

172. See Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of JudicialStandards
of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 101 (1994) ("The paradox, then, is that while journalists
oppose self regulation through detailed professional rules of behavior, they have been silent about
regulation by the judiciary through libel decisions.").
173. See infra Part V (discussing how journalism ethics codes may be incorporated into tort
law standards without resulting in the compromise of the First Amendment).
174. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
175. Id. at 256.
176. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that
"[a]t least with respect to most news publications, credibility is central to their ultimate product
and to the conduct of the enterprise." Newspaper Guild of Greater Phila. v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550,
560 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1123, 1131
(Wash. 1997) ("Editorial integrity and credibility are core objectives of editorial control and thus
merit protection under the free press clauses.").
177. See Clay Calvert, The First Amendment, Journalism& Credibility: A Trio of Reformsfor
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Calvert:
When a free press lacks

credibility, however, the credibility

justification for maintaining its absolute protection and autonomy
against government intervention loses its truism-like appeal. As press
credibility crumbles, it begins to render hollow and meaningless the
value of the special constitutional shield and security afforded the

press under the First Amendment.

Why should we privilege and

provide a profit-making private entity like the press with special
constitutional safeguards that are not given to other entities if the press

is seen as untrustworthy by many people? Some form of government
regulation 78
may be necessary for the press to gain or regain
credibility. 1
In order for the press to regain credibility, it must be acknowledged
by the courts that the press has lost credibility. Above, this Article
discussed how the changing journalism marketplace in the twenty-first
century is fueling tabloid journalism by the traditional media sources
and affecting the media's level of compliance with ethics codes. 179 Tort
standards for the press incorporating First Amendment considerations
that were developed during the third quarter of the twentieth century
and that are still in existence today may need to be revisited. It can
hardly be debated that today's press is less credible, and, therefore, the
basis for constitutional protection has become less compelling than it
once was. The press can no longer operate under the status quo while
180
maintaining that journalism ethics are a paramount concern.
Some state courts have recognized journalism ethics codes in
defining the standard of care for journalists. 18 1 In relying upon the
a Meaningful Free Press More Than Three Decades After Tornillo, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 9,
17 (2005) ("[C]redibility is more than just a journalistic goal. The fact that the press is no longer
seen as credible by many journalists and members of the public has major implications for the
First Amendment. Press credibility is a central, if not critical, rationale for the constitutional
protection of a free press.").
178. Id. at 18 (internal citation omitted). See also Daniel Schorr, Journalismand the Public
Interest, NtEMAN REPORTS, Summer 2005, at 13 ("The press (now more commonly called the
news media) continue to insist on constitutional shelter in the public interest while primarily
serving substantial private interests and sometimes being accused of acting against the public
interest.").
179. See supra Part IV (discussing how the current market forces are not enough to regulate
journalism ethics).
180. See McGuire on Media, http://cronkite.asu.edu/mcguireblog/?p=37 (Nov. 28, 2007, 2:39
pm) ("As journalism standards are weakened by blogs and the 24/7 rush of news, mainstream
media has to be the standard-bearer for ethics and impeccable behavior. Certainly we have a long
way to go.").
181. For example, in holding that the defendant was negligent in the publication of its article,
the court in Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1996), relied on
expert testimony that the defendant's conduct fell below the acceptable standard of care for
journalism based upon the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics and the American
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Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island expressed: "A responsible news medium scrutinizes; it

does not unjustly or irresponsibly incite a wildfire of insinuation. This
court believes that these highlighted sections, and the entire code of
ethics, accurately define the professionalism we would expect, and in

fact the public should demand, from a responsible media." 182 However,
one of the dissenting judges opined that "[t]he majority's pious
reference to the Canons of Ethics for Journalists gives little assurance in
these times where tabloid journalism is becoming the rule rather than
the exception."' 183 While the dissenting judge was certainly correct
fourteen years ago that tabloid journalism was becoming the rule rather

than the exception, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure
adherence to journalism ethics codes so that tabloid journalism goes
back to being the exception rather than the rule. This Part explains how

journalism ethics codes can be taken into consideration by courts when
deciding defamation and privacy cases that affords sufficient
constitutional
protection without deviating from First Amendment
4
norms.

18

A. The Newsworthiness StandardUnder the Disclosure of Private
Facts Tort

The disclosure of private facts tort claim subjects the press to liability
for the publication of truthful private matters that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and that are not of legitimate public
concern. 185 Whether something is of a legitimate public concern turns
on a determination of newsworthiness, and courts struggle with
balancing conflicting interests of individual privacy and press
Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles. See also Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 771
P.2d 406, 430 (Cal. 1989) (noting that the media should not strive to be accurate to avoid liability
but to preserve "high standards of professional craftsmanship" as required by journalistic canons
of ethics adopted by the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the Society of Professional
Journalists); State v. Krueger, 975 P.2d 489, 497 n.ll (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the
Professional Journalism Organization Codes of Ethics does not approve of the defendant
publisher's activity).
182. In re Access to Certain Records of R.I. Advisory Comm. on the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 637 A.2d 1063, 1067 n.1 (R.I. 1994).
183. Id. at 1070.
184. See Todd F. Simon, Libel As Malpractice:News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 452 (1984) (advocating for a journalistic malpractice standard
utilizing uniform journalistic practices); see also Jeff Storey, Does Ethics Make Good Law? A
Case Study, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467, 476 ("The role of ethical codes may become
more important in cases to the extent the codes define detailed and enforceable practices rather
than vague aspirations."). See also infra Part V.A-C (examining the impact journalism ethics
codes could have on courts).
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965).
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freedom. 186 As discussed above, courts have applied varying tests and
factors in balancing the newsworthy value with an individual's privacy
interest in non-disclosure. 187 Thus, courts are certainly capable of
defining newsworthiness; it is simply a matter of courts' adoption and
consistent application of an appropriate test or standard.
The Supreme Court has given very limited attention to the
constitutional privilege of the press to publish truthful private facts, and
has addressed the issue in only one case involving a public disclosure of
private facts tort claim. 188 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,189 a
criminal court clerk allowed a television reporter to see an indictment
containing the name of a rape-murder victim, and the television station
broadcast an account of the court proceedings using the victim's
name. 190 In upholding the press's privilege in this case, the Supreme
Court proceeded cautiously in addressing the newsworthiness issue and
accordingly, narrowed its holding:
Rather than address the broader question of whether truthful
publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it a
different way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area
of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate
to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this
case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public
records-more specifically, from judicial records which are
maintained in connection with a public
prosecution and which
19 1
themselves are open to public inspection.
The most significant aspect of the decision, at least for purposes of
this Article, is the reason for the Court's ruling upholding the privilege
of the press in this instance, which was based on the "responsibility of

186. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) ("It is in the
determination of newsworthiness-in deciding whether published or broadcast material is of
legitimate public concern-that courts must struggle most directly to accommodate the
conflicting interests of individual privacy and press freedom.").
187. See supra Part I.C (discussing the tests used by courts in balancing the private interest of
individual privacy and the newsworthiness of published or broadcast material).
188. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479 ("Delineating the exact contours of the constitutional privilege
of the press in publication of private facts is, however, particularly problematic, because this
privilege has not received extensive attention from the United States Supreme Court. The high
court has considered the issue in only one case involving the common law public disclosure tort,
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469 . . . and its holding in that case was
deliberately and explicitly narrow.").
189. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
190. Id. at471-74.
191. Id. at491.
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the press to report the operations of government," 192 including judicial
proceedings regarding crimes, and the premise that "[b]y placing the
information in the public domain on official court records, the State
must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby
193
being served."'
Fourteen years later in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,'9 4 a case factually
similar to Cox Broadcasting, the Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in a negligence claim involving a Florida statute that
criminally punished the publication of a sexual assault victim's name,
used as a predicate for application of the negligence per se doctrine.
Here, again, the high court was cautious in addressing the
newsworthiness issue, "relying on limited principles that sweep no more
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." 195 The
"limited principle" relied upon was that "'[i]f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."'

19 6

Both Supreme Court decisions provide little guidance in determining
whether a private matter is of sufficient "public interest" (Cox
Broadcasting) or "public significance" (FloridaStar)-in other words,
"newsworthy"-the disclosure of which would be constitutionally
privileged and protected from civil liability pursuant to a common law
tort action. Such little guidance naturally leaves the high court's rulings
open to numerous interpretations by state and federal courts. For
example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit broadly
interpreted both Supreme Court decisions to privilege the publication by
the press of any newsworthy facts concerning any individual, even
when they are facts that people typically very much desire to keep
concealed. 197
However, the Supreme Court of California in Shulman v. Group W

192. Id.at 492.
193. Id. at 495.
194. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
195. Id. at 533.
196. Id. (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
197. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The
implications of [Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star] for the branch of the right of privacy that
limits the publication of private facts are profound. . . . The Court must believe that the First
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the
publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want
very much to conceal.").
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Productions,Inc.19 8 interpreted the decisions much more narrowly. The
court reasoned that in both cases the press "had obtained the victim's
name from a public records source" and the high court's rulings "rested
in large part on the fact the government had, by making the information
available to the press, impliedly determined its dissemination was in the
public interest, and could not then punish a newspaper for 'rely[ing] on
implied representations of the lawfulness of
the government's
19 9
dissemination."'
The California high court further explained that both United States
Supreme Court decisions
establish that truthful reporting on current judicial proceedings, using
material drawn from public records, is generally within the scope of
constitutional protection [but] [t]he decisions do not, however,
enunciate a general test of newsworthiness applicable to other factual
basis for discovery of
circumstances or provide a broad theoretical
2 00
standard.
constitutional
general
a
such
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears
to interpret newsworthiness to mean essentially any information that an
individual has been unable to keep secret and for which the press seeks
to publish (i.e., if it is in the "public domain" then it is "fair game").
This definition of newsworthiness contains no privacy parameters
whatsoever and provides the media with unfettered discretion to
determine whether the information is of sufficient public interest or
significance, which, in essence, amounts to coverage that most
effectively sells papers or boosts ratings. The public domain view
neglects to take into consideration whether the matter is highly
offensive to the ordinary person, which is a necessary element of the
disclosure of private facts tort that cannot be overlooked. As noted by
the California Supreme Court in Shulman, which spent considerable
time evaluating various standards of newsworthiness applied in
previous cases, if newsworthiness is defined as a completely descriptive
term, based upon whether there is widespread public interest, "it would
seem to swallow the publication of private facts tort, for 'it would be
difficult to suppose that publishers were in the habit of reporting
occurrences of little interest. ' ' ' 2° 1 Moreover, the public domain view is

198. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
199. Id. at 480 (quoting Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536).
200. Id. at 480-81 (citing Woito & McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First
Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV. 185, 199-202

(1978)).
201. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481 (quoting Comment, The Right of Privacy: NormativeDescriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722, 734 (1963)).
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inconsistent with journalism ethical duties of (1) providing not only
information that citizens want but information citizens "need to function
in a free society" 20 2 and (2) considering harm to individual privacy
interests such that "[o]nly an overriding
public need can justify
20 3
privacy."
anyone's
into
intrusion
Rationalizing a constitutional privilege on the grounds that the
information is in the "public domain" may be a growing trend by courts
that seem overwhelmed as to how to apply the First Amendment in the
twenty-first century "new media" era. For example, in the Major
League Baseball Advanced Media case discussed above, which
involved the unauthorized use of professional baseball players' names
and performance statistics by a fantasy league operator, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit balanced the players' rights of publicity
against the First Amendment and held that the use of the information
was privileged on the grounds that the information was in the public
domain. 20 4 According to the Eighth Circuit, "the information used in
[defendant's] fantasy baseball games is all readily available in the
public domain, and it would be strange law that a person would not
have a first amendment right to use information that is available to
everyone." 20 5 Although this case involved a right of publicity claim
(which addresses an individual's economic interest) as opposed to a
public disclosure of private facts claim (which addresses an individual's
right to be left alone), the court's broad interpretation of the First
Amendment seems identical to that of the Seventh Circuit. 2 6 In other
words, the rationale is that if the information is readily available to the
public, then it is constitutionally privileged. Just as the California
Supreme Court recognized that the "public domain" view of the First
Amendment privilege would seem to swallow the public disclosure of
private facts claim, the Eighth Circuit's public domain standard
effectively swallows the right of publicity tort as well. 20 7
In its discussion of various standards for determining
newsworthiness, the California Supreme Court in Shulman also

202. Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at A Statement of Purpose.
203. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 12, at Minimize Harm.
204. C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d

818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007).
205. Id.
206. Id.

207. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (reserving, in a false light privacy
case, the question of whether truthful publication of offensive private facts may constitutionally
be punished, and noting a commentator's view that newsworthiness privilege may be so
"overpowering as virtually to swallow the [privacy] tort"').
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expressed concern regarding a definition of newsworthiness "at the
other extreme" that would be based on a value predicate, noting that "if
newsworthiness is viewed as a purely normative concept, the courts
could become to an unacceptable degree editors of the news and selfappointed guardians of public taste." 20 8
Such a standard of
newsworthiness is similar to, and about as problematic in application as,
the "mores of the community" standard. 20 9 Giving some credence to
the normative component, according to the court, the balance is
somewhere in between:
[T]he analysis of newsworthiness does involve courts to some degree
in a normative assessment of the "social value" of a publication. All
material that might attract readers or viewers is not, simply by virtue
of its attractiveness, of legitimate public interest. Second, the
evaluation of newsworthiness depends on the degree of intrusion and
the extent to which the plaintiff played an important role in public
events, and thus on a comparison between the information revealed
and the nature of the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to
public attention. "Some reasonable proportion is ...to be maintained
between the events or activity that makes the individual
a public figure
2 10
and the private facts to which publicity is given.
Citing the case of Kapellas v. Kofman,2 1 1 in which the California
high court found that, in the context of political candidacy, truthful
information is generally protected if it "may be relevant" to
qualifications for office, the Shulman court recognized that this
balancing approach "echoes the Restatement commentators' widely
quoted and cited view that legitimate public interest does not include
'a
2 12
morbid and sensational prying into private livesfor its own sake."'
The California Supreme Court's exhaustive analysis of the meaning
of "newsworthy" in Shulman is instructive in at least three respects.
First, the opinion convincingly demonstrates that newsworthiness does
not exist in a vacuum and, thus, the First Amendment does not clothe
208. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (1998) ("The difficulty of finding a
workable standard in the middle ground between the extremes of normative and descriptive

analysis, and the variety of factual circumstances in which the issue has been presented, have led
to considerable variation in judicial descriptions of the newsworthiness concept.").
209. See Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (utilizing the mores of
the community standard). See also Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292 (Ct. App. 1931)

(holding that the defendant's use was "not justified by any standard of morals or ethics known to
us").
210. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483-84 (citing Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969))

(citation omitted).
211. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
212. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h

(1965)).
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the press with the privilege to publish all truthful information in the
public domain. Second, the court's recognition that "legitimate public
interest does not include a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake" reinforces the view that journalism ethics can
and should be incorporated into tort law standards. Finally, the court
recognized that the truthful information being published must be
relevant, or reasonably proportioned, to the event or activity that
brought the plaintiff to public attention or that made the plaintiff a
public figure. 2 13
In other words, there must be a "nexus" or
"connection" between the truthful information and the public activity or
2 14
event.
The relevance/nexus factor is a critical component in balancing the
First Amendment and journalism ethics standards because such an
inquiry takes into account the purpose, or reason, for the publication of
the matter. If there is a remote nexus or connection between the truthful
matter and the event or activity that brought the plaintiff to public
attention or that made him or her a public figure, then the societal First
Amendment interest in the information is much less compelling because
the purpose for publication becomes primarily one of sensational prying
into private affairs for its own sake or one of pandering to lurid
curiosity. Furthermore, a nexus inquiry does not require judges to
embark upon a normative assessment of the social value of the
information, and, thus, does not infringe upon or compromise the
constitutional protection afforded information that entertains. 2 15 While
courts have universally held that information that entertains is afforded
the same constitutional protection as information that informs, the
constitutional protection afforded entertainment is not compromised by
merely recognizing the relatively weak societal First Amendment
interest in protecting the sensational prying into private affairs for its
own sake or pandering to lurid curiosity. Moreover, a nexus or
relevance inquiry is practical in application and one very familiar to
courts in weighing the admissibility of evidence.

213. See also Diaz v. Oakland Tribune Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting
the newsworthy value in an article directed to the students at a college about their newly elected
student body president that truthfully revealed she was a transsexual). The Diaz court noted that
"[t]he tenor of the article was by no means an attempt to enlighten the public on a contemporary
social issue ....
The social utility of the information must be viewed in context, and not based
upon some arguably meritorious and unintended purpose." Id.
214. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 483-84.
215. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("'The line between the informing and
the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [freedom of the press]."' (quoting Winters v.
People of State of N.Y., 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948))).
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B. Defamation
1. The Actual Malice Standard

On the heels of the New York Times decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,2 16 a significant
defamation law case because the high court extended the actual malice
standard for public officials to "public figures." The case has particular
significance for this Article because the Supreme Court for the first time
grappled with the question of what role professional standards of
journalism, and a publisher's departure from those standards, should
have in determining liability for defamation involving public figures. In
Butts, the evidence showed that the Saturday Evening Post had
published an accurate account of an unreliable informant's false
description of the University of Georgia athletic director's purported
agreement to "fix" a college football game. 2 17 Although there was
reason to question the informant's veracity, the editors did not interview
a witness who had the same access to the facts as the informant and did
not look at films that revealed what actually happened at the game in
question. 2 18 This evidence of the defendant's intent to avoid the truth
would most certainly constitute a violation of codes of journalism
ethics. But this evidence was also sufficient to convince Justice Harlan,
who wrote the plurality opinion, that liability should be imposed for
defamation because there had been "a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." 2 19 Justice Harlan opined that this professional standards
220
rule be used in place of the New York Times actual malice standard.
In Justice Harlan's view, the stricter actual malice standard is more
appropriate for cases involving seditious libel--defamatory material
pertaining to governmental policies and the conduct of governmental
officials and candidates for public office-which demands "extreme
caution in imposing liability." 22 1 Justice Harlan's suggestion that
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
Id. at 156-58.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 153-55.
Id. at 153-54. Justice Harlan wrote:
In New York Times we were adjudicating in an area which lay close to seditious
libel, and history dictated extreme caution in imposing liability. The plaintiff in that
case was an official whose position in government was such "that the public [had] an
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who [held] it."
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seditious libel may warrant a different level of treatment under the First
Amendment was not a novel idea. For example, James Madison made a

similar observation in 1800 shortly after ratification of the First
Amendment:
Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of
the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and
responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends
on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the
candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of
examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates
222
respectively.

Supreme Court decisions following Butts even legitimized what
Justice Harlan advocated: "There is little doubt that 'public discussion

of the qualifications of a candidate for elective office presents what is
probably the strongest possible case for application of the New York
22 3
Times rule.'

However, Justice Harlan's proposed professional standards rule for
public figures was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court. 224 In
his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a majority of
the Court, explained the justification for extending the actual malice

standard to public figures. 225 For example, he discussed developments
since the depression of the 1930s and World War 11-specifically "a
rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of science,
industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction between the

intellectual, governmental, and business

worlds"-in which the

distinctions between the governmental and private sectors became
In the cases we decide today none of the particular considerations involved in New
York Times is present. These actions cannot be analogized to prosecutions for seditious
libel. Neither plaintiff has any position in government which would permit a recovery
by him to be viewed as a vindication of governmental policy. Neither was entitled to a
special privilege protecting his utterances against accountability in libel.
Id. at 153-54 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
222. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 575
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1861).
223. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) (quoting Ocala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971)). "Vigorous reportage of political
campaigns is necessary for the optimal functioning of democratic institutions and central to our
history of individual liberty." Id. at 687.
224. Chief Justice Warren was highly critical of Justice Harlan's professional standards rule:
"I cannot believe that a standard which is based on such an unusual and uncertain formulation
could either guide a jury of laymen or afford the protection for speech and debate that is
fundamental to our society and guaranteed by the First Amendment." Butts, 388 U.S. at 163
(Warren, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 163-64.
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increasingly blurred, resulting in not only a consolidation of
governmental power but also the organization of power in the private
sector.226 Chief Justice Warren wrote that the effect of this "blending of
positions and power" 2 27 between the governmental and private sectors
was the increasing societal role that public figures have in making
policy determinations such that "many who do not hold public office at
the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large." 22 8 The Chief Justice further
explained:
Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not
subject to the restraints of the political process, "public figures," like
"public officials," often play an influential role in ordering society.
And surely as a class these "public figures" have as ready access as
"public officials" to mass media of communication, both to influence
policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities. Our
citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is
in the case of "public officials." The fact that they are not amenable to
the restraints of the political process only underscores the legitimate
and substantial nature of the interest, since it means that public
opinion may be the only
instrument by which society can attempt to
2 29
influence their conduct.
Chief Justice Warren's justification for application of the actual
malice standard involving public figures is consistent with the rationale
for its application involving public officials as provided by the Supreme
Court in New York Times: "[A] profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
230
officials."
While a majority of the Supreme Court strongly opposed Justice
Harlan's proposed professional standards rule involving public figures,
the majority nevertheless reached the same result, applying the actual
226. Id. at 163.
227. Chief Justice Warren explained that "[i]n
many situations, policy determinations which
traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and
implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and
associations, some only loosely connected with the Government." Id.
228. Id. at 163-64.
229. Id. at 164.
230. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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malice standard by finding that the defendant's unethical journalistic
practices, specifically referring to them as "slipshod and sketchy
investigatory techniques," amounted to "reckless disregard for the
truth."2 3' 1 The majority was also troubled by evidence presented in the
case indicating that the publisher's motive in making the defamatory
statement appeared to be based primarily upon financial gain. 23 2 The
majority opinion raises some questions.
What is the majority's
substantive disagreement with Justice Harlan in this case, if any?
Perhaps the majority was concerned that Justice Harlan's proposed
standard for public figures would amount to the imposition of a
negligence standard of reasonable care, despite the fact that his
proposed standard required evidence of "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 2 33 Is
Justice Harlan's standard that far removed, if removed at all, from a
standard of reckless disregard? The majority was most likely not
concerned that Justice Harlan's standard put undue emphasis on the
conduct of the publisher as opposed to the publisher's state of mind,
because the majority acknowledged that "'[r]eckless disregard' for the
234
truth or falsity, [is] measured by the conduct of the publisher."
Perhaps Chief Justice Warren's suggestion that Justice Harlan's
proposed standard is "based on such an unusual and uncertain
formulation" 235 indicates that the majority was concerned about
defining the parameters of journalistic professional standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily followed by responsible
publishers. Yet, the majority had no difficulty whatsoever in making
the determination, in the end, that the defendant did not adhere to such
2 36
standards.
Ironically, Justice Harlan's proposed standard was consistent with,
and merely overtly stated, the manner in which the majority applied the
actual malice standard. Justice Harlan expressly stated his view that
defamation cases involving public figures do not warrant the "extreme
caution in imposing liability" presented by a New York Times situation
231. Butts, 388 U.S. at 169-70 (Warren, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 169 ("Apparently because of declining advertising revenues, an editorial decision
was made to 'change the image' of the Saturday Evening Post with the hope that circulation and
advertising revenues would thereby be increased. The starting point for this change of image was
an announcement that the magazine would embark upon a program of 'sophisticated
muckraking,' designed to 'provoke people, make them mad."').
233. Id. at 155 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 163.
236. id. at 169-70.

2009]

Tort Law and Journalism Ethics

involving seditious libel.23 7 While the majority did not expressly
acknowledge this sentiment, its holding tends to suggest that it
implicitly agreed with Justice Harlan. In other words, the majority
expressly advocated a stricter actual malice standard for public figures
but it did not apply the standard as "strictly" in this particular case, in
essence, applying the less strict standard proposed by Justice Harlan.
Did the majority apply the actual malice standard slightly more
leniently in this case because the plaintiff was an athletic director and
not a public official? Perhaps the fact that the plaintiff was a public
figure as opposed to a public official provided a less compelling reason
in the minds of the majority to permit the press to use the New York
Times privilege as a shield. What we do not know is whether the
majority would have reached the same holding on the same evidence,
had the defamatory statement involved one of seditious libel.
In a case analogous to Butts, the Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton238 reviewed a decision in which
the Sixth Circuit applied Justice Harlan's proposed professional
standards rule in a defamation case involving a public figure who was
running as a candidate for judicial office. In Connaughton, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that a newspaper's decision to rely on one witness's highly
questionable and condemning allegations without first verifying those
accusations and without independent supporting evidence constituted
"an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers," thereby satisfying the
actual malice standard. 2 39 The Sixth Circuit also attributed considerable
weight to evidence presented that the newspaper "was motivated by its
interest in the reelection of the candidate it supported and its [own]
economic interest in gaining a competitive advantage over ... its bitter
rival in the local market. '240 The Supreme Court, relying on its holding
in Butts, emphatically rejected the professional standards rule in
defamation cases involving public figures and also emphasized that the
actual malice standard cannot be satisfied merely through a showing of
ill will or "malice" in the ordinary sense of the term, nor through a
showing that the defendant published the defamatory material in order
24 1
to increase its profits.
237. Id. at 153 (plurality opinion).
238. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
239. Id. at 664.
240. Id. at 664-65, 665 n.6.
241. Id. at 666-67. "if a profit motive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise
available constitutional protection, our cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be
little more than empty vessels." Id. at 667.
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Connaughton and Butts are remarkably similar, a fact which was
acknowledged by the Supreme Court itself. 242 As in Butts, despite its

refusal to acknowledge that a departure from journalistic professional
standards could satisfy the actual malice standard, the Supreme Court in
Connaughton nevertheless affirmed the Sixth Circuit's ruling because it
was convinced that the evidence concerning the newspaper's "departure
from accepted standards and the evidence of motive" supported the
conclusion that the newspaper acted in "reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity" of the witness's allegations. 24 3 However, the holding in
Connaughton is arguably even more peculiar than the majority opinion
in Butts because the Supreme Court even went so far as to say that "we
are satisfied that the Court of Appeals judged the case by the correct
substantive standard," noting that evidence concerning a publisher's
244
motive or care can have a bearing on the actual malice inquiry.
Indeed, even Justice Harlan may not have gone this far, as the public
figure in Connaughton was a candidate for judicial office and, thus, the

case was closer to one involving seditious libel.

Another peculiar

aspect about the holding is that the Supreme Court even acknowledged
that the actual malice standard, and in particular the term "reckless
disregard," are rather "elusive constitutional standards" that cannot

readily be captured in "one infallible definition," thus demanding a
2 45

case-by-case adjudication.
The actual malice standard, and in particular the meaning of "reckless
disregard for truth or falsity of the statement," should not be left in 246
an
elusive state that confuses courts and leads to inconsistent holdings.
242. Id. at 692.
243. Id. at 667-68. "There was unquestionably ample evidence in the record to support a
finding that [the witness's] principal charges were false, either because she misinterpreted
remarks by Connaughton and his wife, or because [the witness] was deliberately lying." Id. at
681.
244. Id. at 668.
245. Id. at 686.
246. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that actual malice can be established "[t]hrough the defendant's own actions or
statements, the dubious nature of his sources, [and] the inherent improbability of the story
[among] other circumstantial evidence"); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 342 (2d Cir.
1969) ("There is no doubt that evidence of negligence, of motive and of intent may be adduced
for the purpose of establishing, by cumulation and by appropriate inferences, the fact of a
defendant's recklessness or of his knowledge of falsity."). But see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 733 (1968) ("Failure to investigate does not in itself establish bad faith."). Compare
Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1198 n.17 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("lI-will, improper
motive or personal animosity plays no role in determining whether a defendant acted with 'actual
malice."'), with Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence of
ill will combined with other circumstantial evidence indicating that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement may also support a finding of
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The Butts and Connaughton decisions stand for the proposition that
evidence of a publisher's "slipshod and sketchy investigatory
techniques" will establish "reckless disregard for the truth." Both
Supreme Court decisions seem to support the consideration of
journalism ethics principles by courts in the application of the actual
malice standard. Therefore, it would not be a deviation from Supreme
Court precedent for courts to take into account the duties of the press
under journalism ethics codes in determining whether a publisher acted
in reckless disregard for truth or falsity of the statement. Indeed, just
the mere recognition of journalism ethics codes by the courts would be
a significant step towards establishing a more credible press and
providing a greater incentive for the press to pay closer attention to, and
247
comply with, their duties under ethics codes.
2. Expansion of Public Figure Status and Scope of the Privilege
In Butts, public figure status was not a contentious issue in the case,
as seven members of the Court conceded that the athletic director at a
major university is a public figure. 24 8 However, in extending the New
York Times privilege to public figures, the high court referred to public
figures as those in the private sector who have a significant role in
making public policy decisions even though they do not hold public
2 49
office and are not subject to the restraints of the political process.
What is not entirely clear from the Butts decision is the scope of the
New York Times privilege as it relates to public figures. Or, to put it a
different way, for what purposes or in what contexts is the plaintiff a
public figure? Here again, this was not a contentious issue in the case
because the published statement concerned the athletic director's
purported agreement to "fix" a college football game, which
undoubtedly related to the plaintiff's discharge of his official duties as
athletic director. 2 50 Seven years after Butts was decided, the Supreme
25 1
Court addressed both issues in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In addressing these issues, the Supreme Court in Gertz first looked to
the definition and scope of the public official designation. The Court
noted that a governmental official voluntarily accepts "certain necessary
consequences" of his involvement in public affairs and "runs the risk of
actual malice).
247. Morant, supra note 7, at 620 ("Yet, the most persuasive signal of the functionality of
ethical codes as standards of liability would be their adoption by the judiciary.").
248. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 163-64.
250. Id. at 136 (plurality opinion).
251. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case."2 5 2 The Court
further opined that the scope of the subject matter covered by the New
York Times privilege "is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of
official duties . . .[but] extends to 'anything which might touch on an
official's fitness for office."' 2 53 Using the same risk assumption
reasoning, the Court described two types of voluntary public figures,
both of whom "invite attention and comment, '2 54 and the Court also
defined the scope of each type.
The first type of voluntary public figure consists of the "famous"
public figure-those who "have assumed roles of especial prominence
in the affairs of society [and] [s]ome occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes." 255 Later in the opinion, in reference to this type of public
figure, the Court noted that "[i]n some instances an individual may
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public
figure for all purposes and in all contexts." 25 6 The Supreme Court in
New York Times limited the privilege to defamatory falsehoods relating
to the "official conduct" of public officials, 25 7 thus drawing a distinction
between their public and private lives. In other words, there must be a
nexus between the falsehood and an event or activity of the plaintiff in
his or her role or capacity as a public official. Moreover, there is
nothing in the Butts decision even remotely suggesting that the Court
intended to expand the scope of the New York Times privilege beyond
the public life of a public figure and into the private life. 2 58 To the
contrary, there is language from the opinion strongly suggesting that the
Court meant to extend the privilege only to the public life of a public
figure: "Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the
conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in
uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is
as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials."' 259 However, the
Supreme Court in Gertz, in defining the scope of the privilege with
regards to defamatory falsehoods involving the famous public figure,
curiously did not draw that same public-private line of demarcation and

252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-45 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
Id. at 345.
Id.

256. Id.
at 351.
257.
258.
259.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
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2 60
broadened its scope to "all purposes and in all contexts."
In regards to the famous public figure, the landmark Gertz decision
left two important questions that remain unanswered by the Supreme
Court to this day. First, why did the Court veer away from its holdings
in New York Times and Butts by broadening the scope of the privilege
involving the famous public figure to "all purposes and in all contexts"?
There is no compelling justification for treating the public official
differently from the famous public figure under the New York Times
privilege. An argument can be made that the public life of a famous
public figure should be subject to the same scrutiny as the public life of
a public official on the grounds that public figures assume the same risk
as public officials that activities and events relating to their public lives
are going to be subjected to public scrutiny. However, the private life
of a famous public figure is no less deserving of protection than that of
a public official and, therefore, the nexus requirement that is afforded
public officials in applying the New York Times privilege should also be
afforded the famous public figure. Ironically, while the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that "[t]here is little doubt that 'public discussion of
the qualifications of a candidate for elective office presents what is
probably the strongest possible case for application of the New York
Times rule,"' 26 1 the scope of the privilege as applied to public figures
("all purposes and in all contexts") is actually broader than its scope in
relation to public officials. 2 62 What is perhaps most curious about Gertz
is that the plaintiff did not even come close to the status of the newlyestablished "famous public figure"-the plaintiff was a relatively
unknown low-profile attorney. 263 So not only did the Supreme Court in
Gertz go beyond the facts in its creation of a new category for public
figures that undoubtedly did not even apply to the plaintiff, but the
Court expanded the scope of the New York Times privilege in a case in

260. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
261. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) (quoting Ocala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971)).
262. Indeed, one commentator has posited the question whether public officials and public
figures actually deserve more protection of their reputations rather than less:
Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz suggests that one who voluntarily enters public life
must accept the risk of closer public scrutiny. Does that justify leaving public figures
practically without remedy for defamatory falsehoods, as the actual-malice standard
and related rules do? Why not hold that the risk of closer public scrutiny justifies more
protection for a public official's or public figure's reputation, rather than less?
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 26, at 1001.
263. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52 ("Although petitioner was consequently well known in
some circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community .... In this context
it is plain that petitioner was not a public figure.").
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2 64
which the New York Times privilege was not even applicable.
Second, while the Supreme Court made clear that only "some" public
figures occupy such a position in which they will be deemed public
figures for all purposes and in all contexts, who are those individuals?
The Supreme Court in Gertz provided no guidelines for courts to
determine whether a particular individual has met the criteria to be a
famous public figure. 265 Although a very fact-intensive inquiry, courts
have generally regarded the determination of whether an individual is a
public figure or a public official as a question of law for the court to
266
decide.
The other type of voluntary public figure defined by the Court in
Gertz for which the New York Times privilege applies is the "limited"
public figure-those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved. '2 67 In this situation, "an individual voluntarily injects
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." 26 8 According to
the Supreme Court, both types of voluntary public figures "assume
special prominence in the resolution of public questions."269 Although
the greater burden on public figures was rationalized by the Supreme
Court in Gertz on the grounds that they voluntarily assume the risk and
have access to the media, in recent years courts have expanded the
public figure classification to even include individuals who were drawn
270
involuntarily into a public controversy.
The ethical dilemmas confronted by the journalism marketplace in
the twenty-first century may require courts to start rethinking the goals
and policies that once supported a dense constitutional shield for the

264. Id. at 352 ("We therefore conclude that the New York Times standard is inapplicable to
this case ...").
265. See VICTOR SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID PARLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND

SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 912, (11 th ed. 2005) ("Beginning in Gertz, through many a long decision,
the courts have searched for a definition of the term 'public figure.' A completion of the journey
will likely cause students to agree that an articulation of the distinction is much like trying to nail
a jellyfish to a wall." (citing Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976))).
266. Id. at 915.
267. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

268. Id. at 351.
269. Id.
270. SCHWARTZ, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 265, at 913 (citing Atlanta JournalConstitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Richard Jewell, who

was caught up in the Atlanta Olympic bombing, was a public figure) and Lohrenz v. Donnelly,
350 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that one of first women combat pilots in the Navy was a
public figure)).
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press in reporting on public figures. 271 Indeed, Gertz left the door open
for courts to revisit the issue due to the Supreme Court's reluctance to
(1) provide any explanation for extending the scope of the New York
Times privilege involving the famous public figure to "all purposes and
in all contexts" in a case in which it was "plain that [the plaintiff] was
not a public figure" and in which the privilege was not even applicable
and (2) provide any guidelines for courts to determine whether a
particular individual has met the criteria to be a famous public figure.
Courts should consider whether the First Amendment demands two
categories of voluntary public figures, the famous public figure and the
limited public figure, as both types involve individuals who have
voluntarily injected themselves into the public arena.
In order for the New York Times privilege to apply to an individual
who is deemed a famous public figure, there should be a nexus
requirement similar to that discussed above in the context of assessing
newsworthiness-in other words, a nexus between the subject matter of
the publication and an activity of the individual in his or her role or
capacity as a public performer. The nexus requirement would at least
put the famous public figure on equal footing with the limited public
figure and the public official by recognizing a line of demarcation
between public and private life.27 2 If the nexus is lacking, the First
Amendment justification for the actual malice standard-that "debate
2 73
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" becomes less compelling. Therefore, when the nexus is lacking, the
burden on the plaintiff to prove knowledge of the falsity, or reckless
disregard for the truth or falsity under the actual malice standard can be
supplanted with an ordinary negligence standard of care. Such a
standard would not protect unreasonable conduct constituting a
departure from standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers.
C. False Light
States have had difficultly determining false light's role in tort law.
Indeed, approximately twenty states have refused to recognize false

271. See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Journalism, Libel Law and a Reputation
Tarnished: A Dialogue With Richard Jewell and His Attorney, L Lin Wood, 35 McGEORGE L.

REv. 1, 5 (2004) (noting that defamation lawsuits involving the involuntary public figure "are
increasingly likely to arise in an age in which the media are quick to pounce on and heap
saturation coverage upon individuals who initially are cast as suspects in high-profile tragedies").
272. See SCHWARTz, KELLY & PARTLETT, supra note 265, at 915 ("Note that a publication

not attaching to a public official's public status does not attract constitutional protection.").
273. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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light as a cause of action. 274 False light's resemblance to defamation
has caused confusion in the courts as to the proper balance of the First
Amendment as well. The source for much of the courts' confusion
appears to have emanated from the Supreme Court's holding in Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 275 that the actual malice standard applies to false light
claims involving false publications of matters of public interest. 2 76 The
actual malice standard, which requires a showing that the defendant
published a report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth, can be applicable only when the false light claim involves a
publication that contains factual inaccuracies. 27 7 In a case in which the
plaintiff is alleging that a publication contains false factual statements,
in addition to asserting a defamation claim, the plaintiff may
alternatively assert a false light claim because a cause of action for false
light can be established without a showing that the published matter was
defamatory. 27 8 In that context, the actual malice standard is applicable
and it achieves the same First Amendment goals as in the context of
defamation actions. However, the false light tort is not limited to
publications that contain factual inaccuracies; it also encompasses a
publication that is literally or substantially true but which creates an
erroneous or misleading impression that renders the publication
susceptible to inferences casting the plaintiff in a "highly offensive"
false light or making the plaintiff out to be something he or she is
not. 279 In that context, the actual malice standard simply does not work;
it is not capable of being applied because the standard is premised on
the publication of false information.
In essence, false light affords a remedy when the press oversteps its
bounds by the careless or highly offensive manner in which the facts are
presented. Consider the following examples previously discussed in
274. See supra note 44 (discussing cases where courts refused to recognize false light claims

as a cause of action).
275. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
276. See supra notes 45, 47 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Time, which
extended the actual malice standard to false reports about matters of public interest, and the
subsequent adoption of this standard by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and other courts).
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a
matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if ... the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregardas to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.") (emphasis added).
278. See Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 386 n.9 (1967) ("In the 'right of privacy' cases . . . the
published matter need not be defamatory, on its face or otherwise, and might even be laudatory
and still warrant recovery.").
279. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the tort of false light as defined in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
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this paper:
" The Pittsburgh Steelers's coach who inadvertently emailed
pornographic material to the commissioner, with the headline,
Sorry for the Porn, Mr. Commissioner.280 Even if the
statements in the publication are true or even substantially
true, the publication infers that the sixty-one year-old coach is
extremely careless or possibly that he is a sex pervert.
* The publication that Manny Ramirez "came into $10,000,
courtesy of the state of Massachusetts . . . which had
languished as unclaimed property" and further added, "Hey,
when you're making $20 million it's easy to forget $10,000
here or there." 2 8 1 The publication infers that Ramirez is
careless with his finances and that he is overpaid and
inattentive.
* The opinion column critiquing Bon Jovi's newly-released
disc, that for no apparent reason singled out guitarist Richie
Sambora and asked, "Who else can pull a 25-year pop-metal
flashback off with such a straight and Botoxed face? '2 82 It is
one thing to critique the band's new disc as well as
Sambora's guitar playing skills, but it is another thing to
make Sambora out to be a "has-been" caught in the past (and
who received a terrible face lift to boot).
* The report that Michael Phelps's father divorced his mother
fifteen years ago, remarried, has had little contact with his
son over the years, and did not even attend the Olympic
Games in Beijing. 2 83 The publication infers that Phelps's
father is a "delinquent dad" who failed in his responsibilities
as a parent.
Certainly, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the false light in
which the individuals were placed in the above examples is "highly
offensive." Moreover, because damages are not presumed, proving
280. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (citing an article exposing a Pittsburgh
Steelers coach for inadvertently emailing a pornographic video to NFL league personnel as an
example of mainstream media publishing information that historically would be found in tabloid
media services).
281. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (citing an article about Manny Ramirez
receiving $10,000 of unclaimed property from the State of Massachusetts as an example of trivial
news coverage by mainstream media).
282. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing a Florida Union-Times article

mocking a musician for the sake of entertainment).
283. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (citing an article about Michael Phelps that
went beyond reporting on his athletic achievements, and instead focused on personal aspects
about his family, as an example of tabloid journalism).
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mental distress or reputational harm may be difficult in some false light
claims. 284 The necessity of having to prove both highly offensive and
285
actual damage serves as a check on unlimited exposure to liability.
However, false light serves a legitimate role in tort law by filling the
gap when a defamation claim fails because the statement is literally or
substantially true (truth is a defense to defamation).286
From a First Amendment standpoint, courts should be cognizant of
the material distinction between a critique, which is not actionable, and
a misleading or an erroneous inference that makes the plaintiff out to be
something he or she is not and thereby casts the plaintiff in a highly
offensive false light. The former is constitutionally privileged because
it has social value and entails the legitimate motive or purpose of
engaging in "uninhibited and robust debate." However, the First
Amendment interest is weaker when the press acts with a motive or
28 7
purpose of making the plaintiff out to seem pathetic or ridiculous,

regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public or private person. Perhaps
the First Amendment interest is weaker in this context because
journalism ethics are being compromised-the two have a tendency to
go hand in hand. Indeed, the motive of the press is certainly relevant
from a journalism ethics standpoint. 288 Courts are sometimes hesitant
to consider a publisher's motive in finding actual malice, which is
understandable when the focus of the inquiry pertains to the publisher's
knowledge of the falsity of the information. But motive can and should
be a relevant factor for the courts in assessing the degree of
offensiveness in which the plaintiff is placed in a false light.
It is widely-recognized that opinions are not actionable in defamation
actions, and nothing advocated herein should be construed as suggesting
otherwise. An opinion, by its very nature, is not a factual statement and
therefore cannot form the basis of a defamation claim, which is
284. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 n.9 (1967) ("In the 'right of privacy' cases the
primary damage is the mental distress from having been exposed to public view ... ").
285. See West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tenn. 2001) (stating
that "the 'highly offensive to a reasonable person' prong of Section 652E deters needless
litigation").
286. Id. ("[W]here the issue is truth or falsity, the marketplace of ideas furnishes a forum in
which the battle can be fought. In privacy cases, resort to the marketplace simply accentuates the
injury.").
287. See Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The falselight tort, to the extent distinct from the tort of defamation (but there is indeed considerable
overlap), rests on an awareness that people who are made to seem pathetic or ridiculous may be
shunned, and not just people who are thought to be dishonest or incompetent or immoral.").
288. See Statement of Shared Purpose, supra note 13, at Core Principle 8 ("Journalism is a
form of cartography: it creates a map for citizens to navigate society.... [S]tereotyping or being
disproportionately negative ... make[s] a less reliable map.").
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premised on falsity. The pertinent question in a false light context,
however, is whether an opinion rises to the level of placing the plaintiff
in a highly offensive false light, which, unlike defamation, and as
discussed above, is not necessarily premised on factual inaccuracies.
There is no redeeming social value in protecting a publisher's opinion
that the plaintiff is pathetic and ridiculous.
The following
recommendations would give journalists a greater incentive to comply
with journalism ethics codes: (1) an increased recognition of the false
light tort among the states, (2) further clarification by courts as to when
the actual malice standard applies in false light claims, and (3)
consideration by courts of a publisher's motive in assessing the degree
of offensiveness.
VI. CONCLUSION

So where do we go from here? When sixty-two percent of national
journalists surveyed this year are of the view that journalism is going in
the wrong direction, something needs to change. The 2008 Pew Survey
results indicate that the press and the free market are incapable of
regulating journalism ethics on their own.
If the press has the
responsibility of determining what is newsworthy, the mainstream news
media will continue to be consumed by tabloid information. It is
therefore incumbent upon the courts to ensure that the press fulfills its
ethical responsibilities to society. It begins with an acknowledgement
that journalism ethics and the First Amendment go hand in hand; they
must co-exist in order to serve the social policies and objectives that
support the First Amendment privilege. Newsworthiness can be defined
to incorporate journalism ethics principles without requiring judges to
embark upon a normative assessment of the social value of information.
In making determinations regarding newsworthiness and whether a
public figure should be subject to the stricter New York Times privilege,
courts should require a nexus between the subject matter of the
publication and the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public
attention or that made the plaintiff a public figure. The standards of
investigation and source verification contained in journalism ethics
codes should be recognized by courts in applying the actual malice
standard in defamation actions. Finally, journalism ethics principles
have relevance in assessing whether a publication rises to the level of
being "highly offensive" for purposes of false light claims.

